Essays on corporate finance under information asymmetry. by Liu, Xuewen





Ph.D. in Accounting and Finance
London School of Economics 
April 2007
I declare that the work presented in the thesis is my own.
Page 1 of 104
UMI Number: U226725
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U226725
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
ibrary
3ntish Library of Political
and Economic S cence
( /  I  %
Abstract
Essay 1: Stage Financing and Syndication in Venture Capital Investment
The combined use of stage financing and syndication is one of the most remarkable characteristics of 
venture capital financing. In particular, the majority of later-stage venture capital investments rather 
than early-stage are syndicated. The paper presents a theoretical rationale for this financial 
arrangement. The model shows that tight control (i.e. efficient refinancing or continuation/liquidation 
decision) of the venture capitalist by stage financing can achieve ex-post efficiency but may 
disincentivize the entrepreneur's effort provision ex-ante. Hence, the project value is not maximized. I 
show that the combined use of later-stage syndication with stage financing is a mechanism that can 
realize the optimal tradeoff between high effort ex ante and efficient continuation ex post thus 
maximizing project value. The model offers testable empirical predictions.
Essay 2: The Capital Structure of Private Equity-backed Firms
In this paper I study one fundamental tension between venture capitalist and management in private 
equity-backed firms and show capital structure (of private equity-back firms) is a mechanism to resolve 
the tension. The paper gives rationale for several financial arrangements in private equity investment. 
(1) Private equity deals are typically partially outside financed even though the private equity fund may 
not be financially constrained at the deal level. (2) The optimal security for outside financing is debt. (3) 
The maturity of outside security is long-term. The insight of the paper has applications outside of 
private equity.
Essay 3: Market Transparency and the Accounting Regime
We model the interaction of financial market transparency and different accounting regimes. This 
paper provides a theoretical rationale for the recently proposed shift in accounting standards from 
historic cost accounting to marking to market. The paper shows that marking to market can provide 
investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives management a “veil” under 
which they can potentially mask a firm’s true economic performance. The model provides new 
explanations for several empirical findings and has some novel implications. We show that greater 
opacity in financial markets leads to more frequent and more severe crashes in asset prices (under a 
historic-cost-accounting regime). Moreover, our model indicates that historic cost accounting can make 
the financial market more rather than less volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The 
mechanism shown in the model also sheds light on the cause of many financial scandals in recent 
years.
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Stage Financing and Syndication in Venture Capital Investment*
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A b s tra c t
The combined use of stage financing and syndication is one of the most prevalent features of 
venture capital financing. In particular, syndication is more likely to take place at a later stage. 
The paper presents a theoretical rationale for this financial arrangement. The model shows that 
tight control (i.e. efficient refinancing or continuation/liquidation decision) of the venture capitalist 
by stage financing can achieve ex-post efficiency but may disincentivize the entrepreneur’s effort 
provision ex-ante. Hence, the project value is not maximized. I show that the combined use of 
later-stage syndication with stage financing is a mechanism that can realize the optimal tradeoff 
between high effort ex ante and efficient continuation ex post thus maximizing project value. The 
model offers testable empirical predictions.
JEL classification: G24, G30, G32, G33, D82.
Keywords: Stage financing; Syndication; Refinancing; Continuation; Liquidation.
*1 am grateful to  David Webb, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Hyun Song Shin, Francesca Cornelli, Denis Gromb, 
Tianxi Wang, Alexander Bleck, Sridhar Arcot, Carsten Bienz and seminar participants at LSE for helpful comments. 
This paper is previously circulated under the title  “Stage Financing and the Role of Syndication” . Contact address: 
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Venture capital financing exhibits great risk and associates with severe informational and in­
centive problems. Three financial arrangements, which are common to nearly all venture capital 
financing, are the main tools employed by venture capitalists to deal with the special nature of 
investment: 1) the use of convertible securities, 2) syndication in investment and 3) the staging of 
capital infusions.1 In the past few years a large literature has developed that studies many aspects 
of these financial arrangements. Yet our understanding of the role of and the relationships between 
these financial tools is far from complete. In this paper, I focus on two: syndication and stage 
financing. I examine how syndication interplays with stage financing and offer a rationale for the 
combined use of them in venture capital financing.
Sahlman (1990) notes that staged capital infusion is the most potent control mechanism that 
a venture capitalist can employ. Financing and investment are made in stages. The stages match 
up with business milestones, such as a demonstration of technology or a successful product intro­
duction. Based on the new released information about the venture at every stage, the venture 
capitalist has the option to abandon the venture whenever the forward looking net present value of 
the project is negative (Cornelli and Yosha (2002)). Considering that an entrepreneur will almost 
never quit a failing project himself as long as others are providing capital (Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1994)), stage financing is particularly important. It functions as an efficient control mechanism 
for the venture capitalist to liquidate any unpromising project. That is, through stage financing, 
the venture capitalist can achieve (ex-post) control efficiency.
In this paper, however, I explore the negative side of stage financing. In fact, the ex-post efficient 
action is not necessarily ex-ante efficient. The tight ex-post control through stage financing may 
disincentivize the effort provision by entrepreneur ex-ante, which in turn lowers the overall value 
of the project. This argument is much in analogue with the one in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(1997), where tight ex-post ownership control disincentivizes the manger to provide effort ex-ante.
In fact, the sequential refinancing decision in staging gives rise to a fundamental tension between 
an entrepreneur’s effort and lack of commitment by the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur exerts 
effort first and the venture capitalist makes her refinancing or continuation/liquidation afterwards.
‘ See Gompers (1995).
2
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(Note: stage financing implicitly gives the investor the right to decide about the continuation or 
liquidation of the project). The entrepreneur obtains a private benefit from continuation. Quite 
naturally the entrepreneur exerts higher effort if and only if he anticipates that there will be a higher 
probability of continuation after making the effort. Also, the entrepreneur’s effort is valuable to 
the venture capitalist in that it can increase the overall value of the project. In order to encourage 
the entrepreneur to exert efforts ex-ante, the venture capitalist should commit to continuing the 
project more often than is efficient ex-post, considering that the project is exposed to huge external 
risk beyond the control of the entrepreneur (e.g. uncertainty about the market condition of an IPC 
or a new product).2 Therefore, there is a tradeoff between high effort and efficient continuation ii 
maximizing the project value of the second-best.3 However, in the world of incomplete contracting,1 
once the entrepreneur’s effort is sunk, the venture capitalist maximizes her own utility by continuing 
the project only if it is worth it (i.e. only if continuation is profitable). Anticipating this behavior 
by the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur may choose an effort level that is lower than seconi 
best. That is, pure stage financing disincentivizes the entrepreneur’s ex-ante effort provision. The 
second-best is not attainable.
The novelty of my paper lies in showing that the combined use of (later-stage) syndication 
with stage financing is a mechanism that can solve the tension, which can implement the secor4 
best. In other words, by using later-stage syndication, the lead venture capitalist commits to tie 
second-best continuation decision that maximizes project value. As for why syndication can induce 
the commitment, the mechanism is in the same spirit as Myers and Majluf (1984). The authors of
2 Venture capitalists and founders may face risks that are equally uncertain for both  parties. Kaplan and Strombcrg 
(2004) denote such uncertainties as external risks. Examples are the extent of future demand for an undeveloped 
product, the response of competitors upon the product’s introduction, and the receptivity of financial markets wfeen 
investors try to sell the company or bring it public.
In contrast, internal risk refers to uncertainties about which the entrepreneur is better informed than the venture
capitalist. It relates to asymmetric information and is the main cause of agency problems.
3 “Second-best” is in the sense that there is still the agency problem of unobservable effort of the entrepreneur-
4 There are two forms of stage financing in reality: round financing and m ilestone financing. Round financing
means that every new tranche is negotiated separately when the venture needs further funding; m ilestone financing 
requires that exact contingencies that the firm has to achieve to obtain new funds are fixed in the initial contract 
(Bienz and Hirsch (2005)). In my setting, as the entrepreneur and venture capitalist are not able to  write or not 
profitable to write a complete contract to specify the terms of future financing, the m ilestone financing is not feasible. 
Staging financing in my paper is round financing.
3
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that paper show external financing under asymmetric information leads to the bad project being 
pooled with the good project and therefore the (unprofitable) bad project may get financed. In 
my context, syndication is ‘external financing’ as the syndicate members are usually much less 
informed of the state of the project than the lead venture capitalist.5 The information asymmetry 
between the lead venture capitalist and the syndicate members will necessarily lead to a similar 
inefficient pooling, i.e. the unprofitable project with a low state of nature may get refinanced and 
thus continued. That is, the lead venture capitalist is induced to continue the project automatically 
more often than if the project is fully inside financed without syndication.6 Such a decision bias 
is not ex-post efficient (i.e. project with negative forward-looking NPV may be continued), but 
is useful to give incentive to the entrepreneur ex-ante. That is, stage financing with later-stage 
syndication can maximize the firm value.
An important empirical implication of the result is that syndication closely associates with stage 
financing. In fact, from the analysis above, if there is no staging, there may not be any syndication 
at all. More specifically, the model implies that the later-stage venture capital investment involves 
syndication. The predication is well supported by venture capital data. The evidence in Hopp 
(2006) shows that VC firms that make use of staging are also more open to syndication. Lerner 
(1994) finds that with a few exceptions all later-stage venture capital investments are syndicated in 
his sample of 271 private biotechnology firms. Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997) document that the 
later-stage venture capital investments are often syndicated. Conversely, eaxly-stage new ventures 
are more likely to be financed entirely by a single partnership. Furthermore, the model of this 
paper indicates that later-stage syndication occurs when the contingencies to obtain further new 
funding are not contracted initially, such as in round financing rather than in milestone financing. 
The evidence in Bienz and Hirsch (2005) supports this prediction. The authors find that outside
1 Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2005) write: “venture deals are often syndicated, with a lead venture capitalist 
raiang funds from partners, who presumably take account of, at a minimum, information on the state of the economy
anc industry in the same way that banks providing financing to buyouts do.”
‘inderst and Muller (2006), which studies credit analysis and decisions, also shows that the information asym m etry
can lead to the agent’s endogenous decision bias. One of key differences, however, is that the borrower has information 
advantage in my model while in Inderst and Muller (2006)’s model it is the lender. Of course, the main difference 
lies in that two papers study different questions and there do not exist any moral hazard issues in that paper. This 
difference also distinguishes my paper with Inderst and Miiller (2004) which studies banks’ loan decision and does 
noi involve any moral hazard problems.
4
. Page 7 of 104
financing (syndication) is indeed more related to round financing than to milestone financing.
The empirical prediction for further testing the model is that later-stage syndication has a 
direct and positive relation with external risk while it is unrelated to internal risk. In Kaplan 
and Stromberg (2004), the authors empirically distinguish the external and the internal risk in the 
venture capital project and then study their relations to the entrepreneur’s compensation and the 
venture capitalist’s control. Using a similar methodology, the model of this paper can be tested 
by studying the relationship between the likelihood of later-stage syndication and the degree of 
external risk and internal risk in venture capital project.
In the literature of venture capital, there are many papers that study stage financing but only 
a few look at the negative side of stage financing. In particular, very few papers examine the 
inefficiency of staging due to its disincentive effect and offer the insight that syndication can be 
a mechanism to mitigate this effect. A close study is Cornelli and Yosha (2003), particularly for 
the model setup. The authors model the negative side of stage financing resulting from ‘window 
dressing’ by the entrepreneur (i.e. the entrepreneur may react to the prospect of early liquidation in 
stage financing with an attempt to manipulate available information). Another close work is Fluck, 
Garrison and Myers (2005), in which the authors also argue that stage financing should be open to 
syndication at a later stage in order to incentivize the entrepreneur. But both the mechanism of 
the model and the methodology of the paper are different in their paper and my paper.
In Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005), the role of later-stage syndication is to reduce the initial 
venture capitalist’s ownership and thus alleviate the holding-up from the venture capitalist. In 
contrast, in this paper, later-stage syndication is to introduce the information asymmetry into the 
firm and thus the venture capitalist can realize her commitment. It is important to emphasize that 
the source of inefficiency in my paper - the lack of commitment - is different with the holding- 
up problem in Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005). The holding-up problem means the venture 
capitalist may not continue a positive-NPV project as she wants to demand a higher payoff from 
the entrepreneur through her bargaining power. This is never the case in my model. The venture 
capitalist always continues a positive-NPV project. The problem is rather that she cannot commit 
to continue a negative-NPV project. In fact, in my setting, the venture capitalist obtains the entire 
monetary payoff of the project. She cannot demand more from the entrepreneur who is penniless
5
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and has no monetary payoff at all. Hence the venture capitalist has no room and no reason to 
hold up.7 Moreover, that paper adopts a new methodology of computing finance, while my model 
uses conventional analysis. Interestingly, however, as Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) and my 
paper are in the same direction and draw a similar conclusion: later-stage syndication has an 
incentive role, the divergence of the specific mechanism to reach the result (i.e. holding-up, or lack 
of commitment or both) is open to future empirical studies.
A small literature provides other explanations for the use of syndication in venture capital 
situations. Lerner (1994) suggests the selection hypothesis as a rationale for venture capital syndi­
cation. Wilson (1986) attributes syndication to venture capitalists’ risk aversion. Cassamatta and 
Haritchabalet (2004), Manigart et al. (2005) and Bygrave (1987) argue syndication helps aggregate 
the different information and/or expertise of the venture capital investors. However, the concern 
of project selection, aggregation of information or risk sharing should be most important in early 
rather than in later-stage investments as the early stage involves greater information asymmetry 
and uncertainty. It is not clear why the later-stage venture capital investments rather than the 
early-stage axe more likely to be syndicated.
Furthermore, people may argue that later stage syndication financing may be due to the VC 
being risk averse and later stage financing tranches being typically larger. By this argument, 
however, the buyout deals (alongside with venture capital deals which axe often made by the same 
or similar private equity funds) should involve syndication even more often because buyout deals 
are usually much bigger than VC deals. Yet this predication is not supported by the available 
evidence that buyout deals are much less frequent to involve syndication than VC deals (Fenn, 
Liang and Prowse (1997)). Also, if the risk-aversion at the later stage is the only reason, then 
later-stage syndication should be equally likely to occur both in round financing and in milestone 
financing. But this predication is again not consistent with the empirical finding that syndication 
is more related to round financing than to milestone financing (Bienz and Hirsch (2005)). At the 
same time, however, I cannot deny the multiple motivations for the use of syndication in reality. 
The theory in this paper, which highlights the role of later-stage syndication, can be seen as
7 One clear sign of the distinction of two papers is that the information asym m etry between the lead venture 
capitalist and the partner venture capitalists in Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) has a negative impact on the 
project value while in my paper such information asymmetry is necessary to  achieve efficiency.
6
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complementary to the existing rationales for syndication.
Prom the theoretical perspective, this paper first shows outside financing under information 
asymmetry can work as a commitment mechanism. While several papers in the corporate control 
literature also study the multiple creditors’ role in the balance between the ex-ante and ex-post 
efficiency, the specific mechanism in this paper to realize the ex-ante commitment - due to ex-post 
information asymmetry - is completely new and different. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the 
presence of multiple creditors inducing the inefficient renegotiation is a mechanism to deter the 
strategic default, which trades off against the costs of realizing a low liquidation value in case of 
liquidity default. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show that switching control rights across hetero­
geneous claimants is a commitment devise. Laux (2001) argues that reducing the headquarters’ 
claim on the project’s cash flow by carrying out the project within a subsidiary and using partial 
external financing in the subsidiary can enable the headquarters to commit to monitor the quality 
of the project prior to marking a continuation investment. Clearly, all the commitment mechanisms 
discussed above are unrelated to asymmetric information. Of course, I also use the insight to study 
venture capital financing and provide a new explanation for one stylized fact - the combined use of 
stage financing and syndication.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model setup and 
the benchmark model where only pure stage financing is used and hence there is a tension between 
the entrepreneur’s effort and lack of commitment by the venture capitalist. In section II, I show how 
the combined use of syndication with stage financing can be a mechanism to resolve this tension. 
In section III, I discuss the robustness of the model. In section IV, I discuss the related issues of 
the paper and provide empirical predications of the model. Section V concludes.
I. The model
1.1. The setup
The model is cast in a simple framework of contract incompleteness and risk neutrality. I use 
the setup similar to Cornelli and Yosha (2002). There are three dates in the model - To, T\ and T2 .
7
Page 10 of 104
The net risk-free interest rate in the economy is normalized to 0 while the subjective time discount 
factors are assumed to be 1.
Consider a venture project which requires two rounds of investment at To and T\ respectively. 
The first round of investment is I\. At To the entrepreneur needs to exert his effort e (where 
e € [0,1]) to boost the venture’s prospect. Specifically, the effort influences the probability of the 
realization of two states (‘Success’ and ‘Failure’) of the project at T\. The probability for ‘Success’ 
is e (equal to effort) while the probability of ‘Failure’ is 1 —e.8 In ‘Failure’ state, the project realizes 
0 final payoff at T2 with probability 1. In ‘Success’ state, conditional on that the second round of 
investment I 2 is made, the project realizes the final payoff x  at T2 . The x  is a random variable 
with density as f(x \0), where 0 is the signal that the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist (VC) 
but no third party receive at T\. The density f(x\9) is positive in the support {0, X }  and satisfies 
First Stochastic Dominance with respect to 9, where X  > 0.9 The 9 has density of g{9) in the 
support [0,1].
Two comments about 9 are in order. Firstly, the signal 9 is not contractable since it is not 
observable by a third party. Secondly, the 0’s distribution g(9) is exogenous, which means that, 
conditional on ‘Success’ state, the realization of 9 at Ti is independent of the entrepreneur’s ex~ante 
effort. I use this setup to capture the feature that the venture capital project’s final payoff not 
only depends on the entrepreneur’s effort but also is exposed to some external risk characterized 
by 9. Kaplan and Strombeg (2004) define external risks as risks that are equally uncertain for 
VC and entrepreneur. In my setup, both parties are equally uncertain about the realization of 
9. Examples of external risk are the extent of future demand for an undeveloped product, the 
response of competitors upon the product’s introduction, and the receptivity of financial markets 
when investors try to sell the company or bring it public.10
8 W hether the states are contractable is not crucial to the result. For simplicity, I assume that the states are 
observable by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist but not by any third party. T hat is, the states are 
uncontractable.
“Specifically, the expression of density is f (x \8)  =  in the support ( 0 ,X } , where 0 <  q{6) <  1 and
q'{8) >  0.
10In fact, in my setup, the state ( ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’) is the internal risk. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) define 
internal risk as uncertainties about which the entrepreneur is better informed than the VC. It relates to asymmetric 
information and is the main cause of agency problem. Indeed, in my setup, the entrepreneur is better informed of
8
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\Obviously, from the setup, it is not optimal for VC to pay all the capital necessary to finance 
the project up front. The staging of capital infusions is better.11 Further, since the states (‘Success’ 
and ‘Failure’) and 9 are uncontracable, stage financing can only be in form of round financing rather 
than milestone financing.12
At Ti, the VC needs to make the refinancing decision, which is equivalent to the liquida­
tion/continuation decision.13 If the VC denies infusion of the second round of financing, the 
project has to be liquidated. In the case of liquidation, the project realizes the liquidation value 
L  at T\ in either state. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I normalize L  to 0. If the 
VC agrees to make the second round of investment / 2 , the project is continued. As I will show, 
in ‘Failure’ state it is optimal for the VC to deny the refinancing. The key decision for the VC 
at T\ is whether she should continue the project in ‘Success’ state after she receives the signal 9. 
Suppose the VC uses a simple ‘switch’ strategy and sets the threshold to 9* (i.e. she continues the
project if and only if 9 > 9*). Then the probability of the project’s continuation at T\ conditional
0= ] .
on ‘Success’ state is p = f  g{9)d9. Hence the ex-ante probability of the project’s continuation is
0=0*
e p. To rule out trivial cases, I assume E(x\9 =  0) < I 2 < E{x\9 =  1). W ithout loss of generality, 
0=1
I also assume f  E{x\9) • g(9)d9 < I2 -14 
0=0
the realization of the states (‘Success’ or ‘Failure’) than the VC. In fact, the entrepreneur can affect the realization
of the states (by his own effort) to some extent while the VC cannot observe the entrepreneur’s effort and hence she
is totally uncertain about the realization of the states.
u If the VC pays all the capital up front, the entrepreneur will always continue the project at T\  and the VC loses
the option of efficient controlling continuation/liquidation. As Adm ati and Pfleiderer (1994) show, entrepreneur will
almost never quit a failing project himself as long as others are providing capital.
12 Round financing means that every new tranche is negotiated separately when the venture needs further funding;
milestone financing requires that exact contingencies that the firm has to achieve to obtain new funds are fixed in
the initial contract (Bienz and Hirsch (2005)). In fact, even if the states ( ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’) are contractable,
it is still not optimal for VC to contract the refinancing decision contingent on the states. It is too costly for VC
to continue the project with all realized 9s in ‘Success’ state. This setup catches the feature of som e young and
immature firms where uncertainty is too high to provide firms w ith proper m ilestones.
13The outsider is uninformed of the quality of the project characterized by the states ( ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’) and
the 9. Hence the entrepreneur cannot raise the funding from a new investor if the old VC denies the funding. The
project has to be liquidated.
14In fact, this assumption is not a necessary condition to derive the result of the paper. The only purpose for 
using this assumption is to rule out some uninteresting cases. The weaker assum ption E (x \9  =  0) <  I 2  is sufficient 
to derive the result. It will be clear later on that the uninteresting case is &SB =  0. P lease refer to  footnote 22.
9
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Figure 1 describes the timeline.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
I assume the entrepreneur derives his utility from the private benefit of running the firm in 
the second period.10 Specifically, the entrepreneur’s ex-ante utility function is assumed to be 
U(e) =  B  x ( e x p )  — ^(e), where B  is his private benefit to run the firm in the second period.16 
The term e x p is his probability that the VC will not liquidate the firm at T\ while the term 
\I/(e) is the entrepreneur’s disutility from exerting effort, which satisfies the standard conditions 
^ '(e ) > 0 and ^"(e) > 0. Moreover, ^(0) =  0, $ ( 0 )  =  0 and #(1) =  -f-oo. Here I abstract 
from the entrepreneur’s monetary compensation by normalizing it to 0 at T\ and T2 . Actually I 
will show that no compensation scheme can solve the commitment problem, hence compensation is 
insufficient in the sense that it cannot eliminate the inefficiency I am considering. At this stage, we 
can think of the private benefit B  as being so high to make any monetary payoff negligible, hence 
the entrepreneur’s monetary payoff doesn’t enter his utility function. Hereafter I normalize B  to 
unity (i.e. B  =  1). By the first order condition: U'(e) =  p — ^'(e) =  0, e is an increasing function 
with respect to p (as e =  ^ /-1(p) is increasing). That is, the higher the probability that the VC 
will continue the project, the higher the entrepreneur’s effort. Clearly, the highest effort that the 
VC can incentivize the entrepreneur to make is e = ^f/_1(l) considering p < 1.
I assume that VC only cares about her monetary payoff. Her utility is the net monetary payoff 
of her investment.
1.2. The benchmark: the venture project is purely stage financed
As a benchmark, in this section I assume that the venture project is purely stage financed. 
That is, the VC solely pays the investments required to the project. If this is the case, the VC’s 
utility is equal to the NPV of the project. Her utility as a function of 0* can be expressed by
15 Naturally entrepreneur has high private benefits if his new product is commercialized and/or his firm is brought
to the IPO. The venture capital project is in fact his ‘baby’.
161 assume that the VC cannot run the firm without the entrepreneur’s participation (maybe due to the entrepre­
neur’s inalienable human capital).
10
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The expected NPV 
The inital Q£ project
investment in the second period
at To 0=1
V(0*) =  +e j  [E (x \6 )-h ]-g (6 )d 0
0= 0*
Given I \  and I 2 , the VC’s utility function depends on the entrepreneur’s ex-ante effort e and 
the VC’s ex-post control 9*. From the ex-ante perspective, in order to give entrepreneur the highest 
incentive to exert effort, the VC’s control decision should be 9*et =  0 ,17 where 9*et denotes the VC’s 
decision to achieve highest ex-ante effort. In contrast, after the entrepreneur’s effort has been sunk 
(i.e. e is given), the VC’s ex-post efficient control should be 9*ep =  min{0| E{x\9) >  Z2}*18 That 
is, ex-post, the VC should continue the project if and only if the project’s expected payoff at T2 is 
higher than the cost of continuing - the second round of investment 72-19
By assumption E(x\0  =  0) < I 2 , I  have 9*t < 9\p. The fact that 9\t is not equal to 9*p
demonstrates that the VC cannot achieve the ex-ante highest incentive and ex-post efficient control
simultaneously.20 Further, as 9* moves from 9*t to 9*p in the interval [9*t , 9*p], the ex-ante incentive
0=1efficiency (the e term ) decreases while the ex-post control efficiency (the term J  [E{x\9) — I2) ■
0=0*
g(9)d9) increases. The highest overall efficiency should be the result of the trade-off between these 
two efficiencies. Naturally, in the world where 9 is contractable, such a trade-off is feasible.
This is the result of the optimization problem
M a x  e 
0 *
=  M a x * ' - l ( J g(d)dd)
0 *  0 = 0 *
18 This is the result of the optimization problem
M a x  V (9 *)
0 *  '
=  - / i  +  e J  [ E { x \ 9 ) - h \ - g { 9 ) d 9  
0 = 0 *
where e is a constant.
lsAlso, here I can justify that the ‘liquidation’ is the VC’s optimal strategy in ‘Failure’ state from the perspective
of both ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-post, the investment I 2 at T\  is higher than cash flow 0 at T2 . It is not optim al to
continue. Ex-ante, the VC must threaten to  liquidate the project in order to incentivize the entrepreneur to  exert 
effort.
">0Here control refers to real control rather than formal control. Aghion and Tirole (1997) distinguish the formal 
and real control.
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If 9* is contractable, the VC’s problem is to find an optimal 9* to be contracted to maximize 
her utility. Program 1 solves such a problem:
Program  1 (PI):
M axV (9 )
0 *
0=1
= M ax - h + e  f  [E{x\9)-h]-g{9)d9  (1)
6 *  0= 0 *
0=1
=  M ax e J  [E (x \9 )-I2]-g(9)d9 (2)
6* 0=0*
0=1
s.t. f  g(9)d9 = ^ '(e) (IC of the entrepreneur) (3)
0=0*
I denote the optimal 9* in the above program as 9*SB and the utility V  at the optimum as Vs b -21
I can prove that 9*SB < 9*p. In fact, if we evaluate the first-order derivative of the VC’s utility
function at 9*p, we obtain 
0=1
=  ^  j  [S(x|fl) -  h ]  g ( 9 ) d 0 -  [S(x|<n - 12] ■ g(ff') ■ e
^  !=*• =°
>0
< 0,
which means that there is scope to decrease 9*p to increase the utility, that is,
erSB < and < W 2 (4)
I define the outcome vector (9*SB, Vs b ) determined by Program 1 as the Second-best.23 For­
mally,
211 assume that V s b  is positive. That is, the VC’s ex-ante participation constraint is satisfied.
0 —  1




J  \E{x\d) -  I2] ■ g(6)dd  -  [E(x\8m) -  h ]  ■ g(6*) ■ e >  0.
< 0
< 0
>3 “Second-best” is in the sense that there is still the agency problem of unobservable effort of the entrepreneur.
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D efin ition  1 (Second-best): I f  there is an equilibrium in which the outcome vector (9*, V ) is 
identical to (0*SB, Vs b )> then we say that this equilibrium achieves the second-best. .
Now let us consider the case when the 6 is uncontractable, which is the assumption of my 
setup. In fact, as the entrepreneur moves first (exerting his effort), the VC moves later (choosing 
her refinancing decision), and the VC cannot commit not to choose her ex-post efficient level 9*p 
after the entrepreneur’s effort has been sunk, the unique equilibrium for this sequential game is as 
follows.
T h eo rem  1 (Pure stage financing Equilibrium) When the venture project is purely stage financed,
there is a unique SPNE (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) of the game in which the strategy
profile is (oe  , cry ) =  (eep, 0*p); where erg is the entrepreneur’s strategy, cry is the VC’s strategy, 
0=1
and eep =  \Er/-1( f  g(6)dQ)). In such an equilibrium, ex-post efficient control is achieved while 
9=&lP
ex-ante efficient incentive is not.
From (4), we know that the VC’s utility under ex-post efficiency is lower than that under the 
second-best. Moreover, since the entrepreneur exerts less effort under ex-post efficiency than under 
the second-best, the entrepreneur’s utility decreases as well.24 Therefore, the second-best strictly 
Pareto dominates the pure stage financing equilibrium.
I summarize the above results in Theorem 2.
T heo rem  2 The equilibrium when the project is purely stage financed is strictly sub-optimal relative 
to the second-best in terms of maximizing the VC’s utility. Moreover, from the viewpoint of social 
welfare, the second-best strictly Pareto dominates the pure stage financing equilibrium.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The fact that the pure stage financing equilibrium is strictly sub-optimal relative to the second- 
best highlights the necessity of VC’s commitment to continuing the project more often than is
"4I provide the formal proof of this assertion in the appendix.
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efficient ex-post, which can boost ex-ante incentive. However, in the 0-uncontractable world, the 
VC lacks the mechanism to commit to such a concession, which in turn induces the entrepreneur 
to exert effort less than the second-best level. This, in the end, reduces the VC’s welfare. In the 
next section, I will show that syndication can actually form a mechanism that enables the VC’s 
commitment making the second-best implementable.
II. The implementation: the second-best is implementable via
contract design
In this section, I show that syndication can overcome the commitment issue. Hereafter, I 
suppose that there is a partner VC (besides the lead VC) participating in the second round of 
financing, who is uninformed of the signal 6. In order to highlight the role of later-stage syndication, 
I assume that the first round of investment is still solely financed by the lead VC. I show that 
after introducing an uninformed third party (i.e. the partner VC) into the firm, the lead VC 
automatically continues the project more often. The second-best is implementable. The intuition 
of the mechanism is in the same spirit as Myers and Majluf (1984), that is, external financing (i.e. 
syndication) under asymmetric information can lead to the unprofitable project being (re)financed 
and hence continued.
II. 1. The financial contract
Before I provide a formal proof of the implementation, I need to discuss the financial contract 
regarding the venture capital-backed firm we are considering. Specifically, I define financial contract
C ', whose terms are summarized in Figure 2. The formal definition of C' is provided in the 
footnote.25
25
D e fin it io n  2 The financial contract of  the firm is a vector C  := ( { ( { (C F /, CR£)}t=o)  } /=  i) ,  where J  is the number  
of claimants. C F (  (6  R ) is the cash flow for  claimant j  at  time t; i t  can be positive, zero or negative. CR% (C S D t ) 
is the decision right endowed to claimant j  at time t  where S D t  is the set of all decisions made fo r  the firm at t ime t.
D e fin it io n  3 We define { C  }, which is a contract subspace of  {C } such that
14
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(Insert Figure 2 here)
Figure 2 describes the cash flow and decision rights allocation under the contract C ' . The basic 
specification of the contract C' can be expressed as follows. There are two security holders: the 
partner VC who is uninformed of the signal 9 and the lead VC. At To, the lead VC contributes 
Ii toward the initial investment. At T\ it is up to the lead VC to decide whether to refinance the 
project.26 If not refinancing, the partner VC doesn’t participate. If refinancing, the lead VC needs 
to pay I2 — F  toward part of the second round of investment, while the partner VC is responsible for 
the remaining part: F. If the project is refinanced, at T2 the lead VC receives the state-contingent 
claim x  — s(x) while the partner VC gets the remaining payoff s(x). Actually, the only unspecified 
clauses in the contract C' are F  and s(ai). Hence, hereafter I use the vector (F, s(x)) to denote the 
contract in space {C }. I also assume that the partner VC is risk-neutral and he joins the financing 
at competitive terms.27
Under the financial contract (F, s(x)), the lead VC’s utility function becomes
J  =  2 
and
C' =  ( { { C F f , C R $ U C F ? , C R ? U C F f , C R $ ) ) ,  ( (C F ? , C R g ) , ( C F ° , C R ? ) , ( C F ? , C R :? )))
if  firm is refinanced
I
if firm is not refinanced
C F f  =  x — s(x),  C F °  — s ( i) ;  C R 2  =  nothing, CR% =  nothing;
Both s(x)  and x  — s(x)  are non-negative and non-decreasing with respect to x  (Innes (1990)). (5)
26Considering the information structure in our setup where at 7 \  only the lead VC and entrepreneur can observe
the signal d, it is natural to limit the contract space to the one that still gives the refinancing decision rights to the
lead VC rather than the partner VC. It is not optim al to give the decision rights to entrepreneur, who always wants
to continue.
2 7 Under the relaxed assumption that the partner VC demands positive rent for financing, the main result of the 
model does not change.
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where E  =  L ead V C ,  O  =  P a r tn e r  VC;
CFq =  —h ,  CFq =  0; CRq =  nothing, CRq =  nothing; 
c f e  f ~ { h ~ F )  if firm is refinanced  ^ ^  _  f ~ F
I 0 if firm is not refinanced I 0
C R f  =  r e f in a n c e  or not, CR®  =? nothing;
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The expected NPV 
The lead VC’s for the lead VC
initial investment in the period
at T q 0=1
V ( S ' ) =  ^  + e  J  E { [ x - s ( i ) ) - ( I 2 -F)\0}-g(B)d9  (6)
9= 9*
Ex-post, the lead VC continues the project if and only if her expected payoff at T2 of continuing 
is higher than the cost of continuing, that is,
Q* = min{0| E[x -  s(:r)|0] > I 2 -  F}.
As for the partner VC who is un inform ed of 9, since his reserve utility is zero, his participation 
condition is:
df ( E [ s ( x ) \ 9 } - F ) - g ( 9 ) d 9  = 0. 28 (7)
9= 9 *
As  for the entrepreneur, his decision is still governed by his (IC) condition (3).
I I .2. Im p lem en ting  th e  second-best w ith  th e  financial co n trac t
The lead VC decides the financial structure (that is, chooses the financial contract (F,s(x))) 
at To when the project starts. Such a decision is made before the entrepreneur’s decision to exert 
effort. Figure (3) describes the new timeline.
(Insert Figure 3 here)
As the partner VC breaks even and receives zero surplus, the lead VC obtains the same surplus 
and utility under the financial contract (F,s(x )) as at the second best if she chooses 6* as 0*SB. 
Formally,
L em m a 1 Under the financial contract (F, s{x)), if 6*SB is implemented in equilibrium, then Vsb  
will be automatically implemented.
The partner VC’s participation constraint is binding in the case of this paper.
16
Page 19 of 104
P roof: If I add the LHS of (7) to the RHS (6), I obtain
V(9*) = - h  + e J  [E(x\9)-h]-9{0)de  (8)
0=0*
which is identical with the objective function (1) in (P I). Therefore, if 9*SB is implemented 
(hence e under the second-best is implemented), Vsb  will be implemented. Q.E.D.
Prom Lemma 1, I can conclude that in order to implement the second-best we only need to 
implement 0* at 9*SB. Further, from the analysis in the last subsection, we know that 9* under the 
financial contract (P, s (i))  is determined by the following joint equations
9* =  min{9\E[x — s(x)|0] > I2 — F} (the lead VC’s rational choice)
< 0=1
J  (E[s(x)\9] — F) ■ g(9)d9 = 0 (IR of the partner VC)
. 0=0*
Note that x  can only be one of two values: 0 and X . By limited liability of the lead VC, 
we have s(0) =  0. I also denote s(X)  =  K , where K  is the payoff for the partner VC at date 
2 contingent on that the project’s final payoff is X .  Taking I2 and F  as parameters, there are 
only two unknown variables 9* and K  in the joint equations (10) and (11) while we also have two 
equations. Hence, the equation system is solvable. Given I2 , the s(x) (i.e. equivalent to K ) and 
9* are both uniquely determined by F . I denote the map between F  and 9* as 9* =  9*{F). Now 
the implementation problem of the second-best is converted to the problem whether I can find an 
F  such that 9*(F) =  9*SB.
I discuss two properties of 9*(F) first.
Lemma 2 I f  F  > 0, 9* is downward biased (i.e. 9*(F) < 9*p).
I provide the mathematical proof first. In order to satisfy the participation condition (10) of the 
partner VC, K  must be strictly positive. That is, s(x) is a strictly increasing function in {0, X}. 
Hence s(x) becomes an information sensitive security.29 A higher 9 will lead to higher F [s(r) |0]. 
From (10), we know that the new VC claims F  on average for all 9 in [9*(F), 1]. Therefore, the 
claim for the lowest signal 9*(F) must be lower than F , that is, F[s(r)|0*(F)] < F. While we have
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E[x — s(x)|r(F)] = I 2 — F  by (9), E[x\9*(F)], which equals j£[s(i:)(0*(.F)] +  E[x — s(:r)|0*(.F)], 
must be lower than I2 . Combining the above result with E(x\9lp) =  I2 , the relation 9*(F) < 9*ep 
follows.
The intuition for the lead VC’s decision bias under syndication is direct when explained in the 
framework of Myers and Majluf (1984). In fact, after the initial date To’s investment I\ has been 
sunk, the lead VC’s (forward-looking) refinancing decision at T\ is a one-period investment decision, 
which is essentially the one in Myers and Majluf (1984). That is, the lead VC is making a decision 
whether to invest a project with the investment cost as I 2 and payoff as x  at the next date. This 
financing and investment decision is made under asymmetric information as the lead investor but 
not an outsider knows the project’s quality (or type) (which is characterized and indexed by the 
continuous real number 9). By Myers and Majluf (1984), if the project is fully internally financed, 
the efficient separating equilibrium is achieved, i.e. the project is financed and invested if and only if 
it is profitable, that is, if and only if E[x\9\ > I2 . This'is exactly the equilibrium of our model when 
the project is purely stage financed without syndication. However, if the lead investor is ‘financially 
constrained’ and she has to raise F  amount of external finance from an uninformed outsider, from 
Myers and Majluf (1984) we immediately conclude that inefficient pooling is unavoidable (Note: 
unavoidable because the project type 9 in my setup is continuous, which is a bit different from 
Myers and Majluf (1984)’s setting where project type is discrete (‘Good’ or ‘Bad’)). That is, some 
unprofitable bad types of project (with a low 9), which are ‘subsidized’ by the good types (with a 
high 9), will necessarily be financed. This inefficient pooling is the fundamental reason for the lead 
VC’s decision bias when syndication is used in our model.
The two key messages from Myers and Majluf (1984) are:
Message 1: If the firm uses external finance, the bad type of firm is possible to be pooled with 
the good type and hence be financed.
Applying this message to the context of our model and also considering that the project type 
9 in our setup is continuous, the intuition of Lemma 2 is direct.
It is worth noting that the result in Lemma 2 (and thus the robustness of the model) doesn’t 
depend on the specific assumption of the binary payoff structure of the paper -  the project either
18
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pays zero or X .  Suppose for instance that project returns follow some continuous distribution 
function. Under the new assumption, as long as s(rc) satisfies (5) of Innes (1990)’s condition (hence 
s(x ) is an information sensitive security dE[3(*)\6] > o) but no m atter whether s(x) is convex or 
concave, by Myers and Majluf (1984) the pooling equilibrium is unavoidable, that is, 9* goes down. 
The mechanism here is different with the asset substitution problem (i.e. equity-like claim for VC 
will induce her to continue excessively while debt-like claim leads to the opposite effect).
Message 2: The more external finance the firm uses, there is a higher possibility of inefficient 
pooling (i.e. the bad type of firm is more likely to be financed).
The counterpart to this message is the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 The lead VC’s decision bias under syndication is continuous and increasing with respect 
to F  (i.e. 6*(F) is decreasing in F).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Now I am ready to present that the second-best can be implemented by the contract (F , s(x)).
Theorem  3 There exists a financial contract in space {(F, s(x))} that can implement the second- 
best. That is, there exists an F  lying in the interval (0,I2) such that 9*(F) — Q*sb-
Proof: See the appendix.
I denote this contract that implements the second-best as (F *, s*(x)), where
{ 0 when x  =  0 and K * is endogenously determined by (10).
K* when x  = X  
(Insert Figure 4 here)
• I present the formal proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix. Figure 4 shows the basic intuition. In 
Figure 4, if the lead VC uses 0 syndicate financing (i.e. F  is 0), she chooses 9* as 9*p. As syndicate 
financing F  increases, 9* falls. In the extreme case, if syndicate financing F  equals I 2 , 0* is O.30 
Hence, there is an F* between 0 and I 2 which can implement 9*SB.
30 A more rigorous analysis for the extreme case is provided in the Appendix.
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Theorems 3 implies the contract terms of syndication. That is, the partner VC pays F* amount 
of capital participating in syndication and obtain ^  proportion of the firm’s total shares as payoff. 
Moreover, the partner VC mainly has cash flow rights but few control rights (e.g. continuation 
/liquidation decision rights). This arrangement of syndicate contract seems quite consistent with 
reality.
So far I have presented that syndicate financing can work as a mechanism to overcome the 
commitment problem of pure stage financing. That is, the combined use of later-stage syndication 
with stage financing can maximize the firm value.
III. Robustness issues
I I I .l . R enegotiation is im possible
I consider renegotiation between the lead VC and the entrepreneur and between the lead VC 
and the partner VC in order.
Between the lead VC and the entrepreneur
As the entrepreneur derives a private benefit from continuing the project, there may exist some 
9 (below 9*Sb ) at which continuation is socially optimal (i.e. the private benefit plus the mone­
tary payoff) while liquidation is the equilibrium in the second-best. In such cases, renegotiation is 
mutually beneficial to both the lead VC and the entrepreneur ex-post. However, because the entre­
preneur is penniless and obtains zero monetary compensation from the project, he does not have 
any financial resources to bribe the lead VC into continuation incurring. Therefore, renegotiation 
in this case is impossible.
Between the lead VC and the partner VC
Renegotiation between the lead VC and the partner VC is impossible due to the information 
asymmetry. In fact, when 9 6 [#sb, 9lp] the lead VC inefficiently continues the unprofitable 
project in the second-best. There is scope for the lead VC and the partner VC to engage in 
mutually beneficial renegotiation ex-post at T\ . However, due to asymmetric information between 
the two parties (i.e. the partner VC cannot observe 9), the only possibility for mutually beneficial
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renegotiation is that the lead VC initializes the proposal for a new contract after she observes 
^ £ [^ 5J3> ^ep]-31 The new contract provides not to refinance (and liquidate) the project but the 
partner VC needs to pay some money to compensate the lead VC.32 But the lead VC can provide 
the same proposal when 9 < 6*SB in which she does not decide to refinance the project anyway 
even under the original contract and thus the new contract is only beneficial to the lead VC while 
making the partner VC worse off. Therefore, the partner VC will not ‘tru st’ the lead VC. Hence, 
the renegotiation in this case will not happen either. The second-best equilibrium is sustained.
III .2. M onetary com pensation for the entrepreneur is insufficient
In this subsection I am going to prove that the monetary compensation scheme for the entre­
preneur is insufficient because it cannot solve the commitment problem I discuss above. This is the 
reason why I could abstract from monetary compensation by normalizing it to zero so far.
I provide the intuition first. Suppose the entrepreneur cares about the monetary payoff as well 
as the private benefit. His ex-ante effort depends on his expectation on these two kinds of payoffs. 
Thus, there are also two ways for the lead VC to incentivize the entrepreneur to exert effort: pay 
the entrepreneur a monetary compensation or give the entrepreneur her commitment to continue 
the project. The latter concerns the second type of payoff — the private benefit. Note that both 
of the above two incentives are costly to the lead VC. It is obvious that monetary compensation is 
costly. The commitment is costly because some unprofitable project will be continued under the 
commitment. In order to incentivize the entrepreneur to exert a certain level of effort, I am arguing 
that the optimal compensation policy should be a mix of monetary compensation and commitment. 
It is never optimal for the lead VC to use just one incentive. In particular, monetary compensation 
alone is too costly relative to a mix of monetary compensation and commitment to achieve a certain 
level of effort. That is, the commitment is always necessary for minimizing the lead VC’s cost and 
maximizing her wealth. In order to highlight and concentrate on the effect of commitment instead 
of monetary compensation on effort, I have disregarded the monetary compensation and assume 
the entrepreneur does not care about money or that the monetary payoff is negligible compared to 
the private benefit.
31 In fact, this is a signaling game.
3"W ithout loss of generality, I assume that the lead VC has full bargain power.
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Now let us move to the mathematical proof. I consider all possible monetary compensation
schemes for the entrepreneur. Note that my assumption is that the ‘Success’ and the ‘Failure’
states are uncontractable. The only contractable variable is the ‘continuation’ and ‘liquidation’
decision. Therefore, the available compensation schemes for the entrepreneur can be expressed in
the form of (n, m(x)), where n (> 0) is a constant salary in case of ‘Liquidation’ and m(x) is the
compensation in case of ‘Continuation’. Under such compensation, the entrepreneur’s utility can
0=1
be rewritten as U{e) = [(1 — e) +  e(l - p ) ] - n  + e- f  {B  + E[m(x)\9]} • g(9)d9 — ^(e). Since the
e=e*
project’s liquidation value is zero, n must be 0.33
When the firm is purely stage financed (i.e. no syndication), under the compensation scheme
(n =  0,m (x)), the lead VC’s utility is 
0=1
V(9*) — —I\ +  e • f  { E [ x - m { x ) \9 ] - I 2}-g(9)d9  (12)
6= 6 *
Ex-post, the lead VC chooses 9* as 9*p = min{0| E[x — m(x)\9\ > fy}- Again, I can prove that 
the lead VC’s utility V(9*) will increase if 9* decreases a bit by taking later-stage syndication. In 
fact,
0=1
§p-\«'=s;p =  J  {£[£ -  m{x)\B] -  h )  ■ g{8)d8 -  {£[x  -  ro(x)|g'] -  h ]  • ■ e
^   . • ' 2
>0
< 0.
Therefore, later-stage syndication is useful and necessary in order to maximize the lead VC’s 
utility.
Nevertheless, when the lead VC pays monetary compensation to the entrepreneur, there is scope 
for the lead VC and the entrepreneur to renegotiate at Ti because the entrepreneur is not wealth
33Even if the liquidation value is not zero, I can still prove n to be 0. In fact, by the first order condition U  (e) =  0,
we have f  { ( B  — n) +  E[m(x) \9]}  • g(9)d9 =  ^  (e) (IC) (11)
o=e*
From (11), I obtain that e is a decreasing function of n, that is, the higher the entrepreneur’s salary in case of 
‘liquidation’, the lower the effort the entrepreneur exerts. From the perspective of the VC, it is also costly for her to  
pay the entrepreneur the compensation n. Considering that the VC prefers the entrepreneur to exert high effort, n  
must therefore be 0 in the optimal compensation. Intuitively, in order to incentivize the entrepreneur to exert effort, 
it is optim al to the VC to increase the difference in compensation in ‘liquidation’ and ‘continuation’. The highest 
difference occurs when n  =  0.
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constrained now. Without loss of generality, I assume that the lead VC has all the bargaining power. 
Without renegotiation, the lead VC chooses 9* as 9*ep = min{0| E[x — m(x)\9] > I2 }. Obviously, the 
lead VC inefficiently liquidates the project too often. Renegotiation can achieve ex-post efficiency 
by pushing 9* down to min{0[ E[x\9\ > I 2 }. In fact, when 9 6 [min{0| E[x — m{x)\9] > / 2 }, min{0| 
E[x\9\ >  / 2 }], renegotiation results in the project being continued while the lead VC pays zero 
monetary compensation to the entrepreneur under such continuation. This renegotiation makes 
both parties better off relative to no renegotiation. The above problem is equivalent to the debt- 
overhang problem, where ‘debt’ is m (x).
After taking renegotiation into account, the problem is the same as the one I was studying 
in Section I, where 9* is also 9*ep =  min{0| E[x\9\ > I2}. Clearly, on the basis of monetary 
compensation (n, m(x)), syndication can reduce 9* further and make 9* fall below 9*p to implement 
the second-best. Therefore, syndication is necessary even if I take monetary compensation and 
renegotiation into account.
Finally, I want to point out that the assumption that the ‘Success’ and the ‘Failure’ states are 
uncontractable is not necessary for us to derive the result in this section — monetary compensation 
is insufficient. I can show that even if the states are contractable, monetary compensation still 
cannot solve the commitment problem. Syndication, which can realize the commitment, is still 
necessary. As this argument is not necessary for the paper, I omit its mathematical proof.
IV. Discussion and empirical implications
IV. 1. Using later-stage syndication: formal contract Vs im plicit enforcem ent
From the analysis in Section II, using later-stage syndication can be formally contracted. The 
contract is signed before the entrepreneur’s decision to exert effort at To- In reality, as with bank 
syndicated loan contract (Sufi (2007)), the lead VC and the partner VC usually form a syndicate 
group to contract together with the entrepreneur to finance the entrepreneur’s project jointly. The 
contract specifies the control rights and cash flow rights. Typically the lead VC takes the main 
responsibility of monitoring the project process (i.e. control) while the partner VC mainly holds
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cash flow rights. The partner VC can participate in some or all rounds of financing (for example, 
the partner VC contributes certain proportion of funding at each round). In Section II, in order to 
highlight the role of later-stage syndication, I assume that the partner VC only participates in the 
second round of investment. But the model doesn’t preclude syndication at an earlier stage. The 
crucial point is that the later-stage syndication is always necessary (otherwise the entrepreneur 
does not exert sufficient effort).
How popular is the later-stage syndication being formally contracted in advance in reality is 
largely an empirical question. Since little empirical evidence regarding syndication contracts is 
available, the answerer to this question requires future empirical work. Nevertheless, if the lead 
VC, entrepreneur and the outside VC all have a good idea about the structure of the project (e.g. 
distributions of the signal and the cash flow), later-stage syndication realized by a formal contract 
should be common in practice.
However, it is important to emphasize that the conclusion in Section II that there exists a 
(unique) optimal prior syndicate contract is built on some simplifying assumptions, e.g. both the 
VCs and the entrepreneur precisely know the distributions of the signal and the cash flow. I use 
these simplifications to provide a benchmark description of a relatively perfect world (as in most 
theories like the Modigliani-Miller theorems), and thus highlight the main insight of the paper: 
the later-stage syndication can mitigate the fundamental incentive problem due to external risk. 
However, these simplified assumptions are not always true in reality. If this is the case, the lead 
VC’s ex-ante commitment to the exact terms of syndication by an explicit prior contract is no longer 
optimal, particularly considering that the ex-ante syndication contract is hard to renegotiate ex­
post and renegotiation itself is costly. Therefore, in many situations, more vague commitment may 
be better. In fact, in the imperfect situation where there is uncertainty about the distributions of 
signal and cash flow, it is impossible to completely solve the ex-ante incentive problem. However, 
the commitment to later-stage syndication is still very valuable. As the computation result in 
Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) shows, the tiny ex-post disincentive effect on the ex-ante effort 
provision can have a significant impact on the overall firm value.
An important implicit mechanism to enforce the lead VC to take later-stage syndication is the 
partnership covenant. This is also the argument in Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005). In reality,
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the covenant in partnership agreements between venture capital firms and their limited partners 
typically prohibits funds from investing more than a small percentage in any portfolio company and 
in any round of investment (Sahlman (1990), Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1997)). Such a covenant 
forms a commitment device that assures that syndication at a later stage is credible, particularly 
because later-stage investment usually requires a larger investment.
Now the whole logic of the model can be expressed in the following way. That is, although the 
venture capital fund is not financial constrained at the deal-level (e.g. the capital raised at the time 
the fund is formed may be enough to cover the required funding for some deals), the covenant forces 
the deal-level investment to involve some external finance. External financing under asymmetric 
information, however, will necessarily lead to an inefficient investment decision. In the context 
of stage financing, it is an inefficient refinancing and continuation/liquidation decision because 
the investment and financing decision as well as the information asymmetry takes place at the 
intermediate date rather the initial date. (Note: at the initial date, both the insider and the 
outsider are equally uncertain about the quality of the project. But as time goes, the insider 
becomes better informed of the prospect of the project (characterized by 6) than the outsider. 
That is, the information asymmetry takes place at the intermediate date.) More specifically, after 
using outside financing (i.e. taking later-stage syndication), an unpromising venture capital project 
may be continued. As the outside investor breaks even, all the costs of inefficiency are borne by 
the lead investor. Thus the later-stage syndication is not efficient ex-post for the lead VC but it 
can provide incentive to the entrepreneur ex-ante, which in turn increases the overall project value 
for the lead VC.
Finally, I argue that the implicit mechanism can be reputation. For example, at To, the entre­
preneur may choose only the VC who indeed uses later-stage syndication in the previous business. 
In turn, the VC fund, as one form of a financial intermediary who cares about reputation, has 
an incentive to realize her commitment to use syndication at a later stage. Syndication, unlike 6 
which is unobserved by an outsider, is a public signal. Taking syndication at later-stage is helpful in 
building the future reputation. In contrast, the lead VC’s loosening of the ex-post control privately 
by lowering the criterion 6* directly is useless since no outsider can observe 0.
IV .2. Further empirical testing
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I provide one more empirical prediction for further testing the model. The model predicts 
that syndication is highly related to external risk but is unrelated to internal risk. In fact, as 
I have shown, outside financing other than monetary compensation is needed to incentivize the 
entrepreneur to provide effort precisely because of the presence of the external risk involved in the 
project. Hence the model predicts that the later-stage syndication is more likely to occur if there 
is higher external risk involved in the project beyond the control of the entrepreneur, but it is 
unrelated to internal risk. (In contrast, if risk aversion is the reason, the later-stage syndication 
will be positively related to both external and internal risk.) In Kaplan and Stromberg (2004), the 
authors empirically distinguish the external and the internal risk in the VC project and then study 
their relations to the entrepreneur’s compensation and VC control. W ith a similar methodology 
(and perhaps using a large sample of data), the model can be tested by studying the relationship 
between the likelihood of later-stage syndication and the degree of external risk and internal risk 
in the VC project.
V. Conclusion
This paper provides a novel theory of syndication in venture capital financing. It shows that 
later-stage syndication is a mechanism to alleviate the inefficiency of pure stage financing. The 
combined use of later-stage syndication with stage financing is more efficient than the pure stage 
financing. The theory can explain well why stage financing in reality is typically combined with 
syndication, and in particular why syndication is more likely to take place at a later stage.
The sub-optimality of pure stage financing is the result of stage financing inducing tight ex-post 
control by the venture capitalist, which disincentives the entrepreneur’s effort provision ex-ante, 
which in turn lowers firm value. The disincentive effect of tight ex-post control, however, in the end 
is attributed to the special nature of venture capital investment: huge external risk besides internal 
risk, high private benefit (for the entrepreneur) besides his monetary utility. Under these features, 
monetary performance-based compensation is not sufficient (to incentivize the entrepreneur). Using 
later-stage syndication under asymmetric information (thus loosening ex-post control) in addition 
to performance-based compensation is a better strategy. This subtle mechanism can be regarded 
as one of the responses by the venture capitalist to the particular challenges of venture capital 
financing: high risks, severe informational problems and various incentive issues.
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Finally, admittedly, in practice venture capitalists are commonly believed to have a financing 
and an advisory function, while in my model VC only provides financing but does not otherwise 
contribute to the project. Hence, my model only explores one aspect of the venture capital financing 
while abstracting from the other one. But it is impossible for one economics (finance) model to 
explore every facet of reality. Again, the theory in this paper can be seen as complementary to 
the existing venture capital theories that explicitly model the advisory role of VC like in Fluck, 
Garrison and Myers (2005) and Cassamatta (2003).
27
Page 30 of 104
Appendix: proof
Proof of Theorem 2: I only need to prove that the entrepreneur’s utility under the pure stage
financing is less than that under the second-best. Since 9*SB < 0*p, I have e*SB > a*ep where e*p is
0=1
the entrepreneur’s effort under the pure stage financing. Therefore, U(e SB ) — [e5B ' I  d{9)d9]
* ( 4 b )  > K -  6f  g (e )M )-v (P e p )>  K -  y  g(O)d0\- * ( ? „ ) .  Q.E.D.
0=0%  a 6= 0 *
Proof of Lemma 3: The continuity is trivial since all the functions involved are regular and 
continuous. To prove monotonicity, I need to show that if Fnew < F0id, then 9^ew >9*old , where
{ 0 when x = 0 )
K  when x  =  X
can be alternatively expressed as s(x) =  min(x ,K ).
0=1  _ 0=1  
From (10), I have f  {E[(m in(x,Koid)\9\—Foid}-g(9)d9 = 0 and f  {i?[(min(x, Knew)\9\ —
6 = 6 'old 0=o*nev>
6=0*nev> .  f l= i
Fnew} • g(9)d9 =  0. Hence, /  {£[(min(x, Koid)\0] ~  F0id} • g{9)d9+ f  {i?[(min(x, Koid)\9] -
6=e*old 0=0*new
0=1
Fm } ■ g(9)d9 -  f  {£[(m in(x,K new)\9] -  FnevJ} ■ g(9)d9 = 0 
o=d'new
Rewrite the above equation, I obtain,
6 = 6 * ew  .  0=1  
f  {E[(imn(x,Koid)\9]-F0id}-g(9)d9 + J  {£[min(x, ATo/d) -  min(x, Arneu;)|0] -  {F0id~  
6=6*old 0=0'new 
Fnew)} ’ g{9)d9 — 0 (13)
Clearly, from Fnew < F0id, I have K 0id > K new. Thus min(x, K 0id) — min(x, K new) is an
increasing fimction as x € {0,X}. Therefore, £[m in(x,K 0id) — min(x, K new)\9] is increasing
of 9. As 9*new -> 9*old, the first term in (13) approaches 0 and the second-term approaches 
0=1 ,  0=1  
f  {E[m in(x,K0id )-m m (x ,K new)\9}-{F0id -F new) } ’g(9)d9. Thus I get /  (2?[min(x,K m ) -  
6=6*old  e=0'old
min(x, Knew)\9] -  (Foid -  Fnew)} • g(9)d9 = 0, which means £[min(x, K 0id) -  min(x, K new)\9*old\ <
Fold Fnew
By (9), we know £[(max(0, x-Knew)\9new] =  h ~ F new. But £[(max(0, x - K new)\9*oid\=E[(max(0, x -
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K oid)\e*old]-E[max(0, x - K old)-m ax(0, x - K new)\9*old] = (l2 - F 0id)+E[mm(x, K 0id )-m m (xt Knew)\Kid] <
(^2 F 0id) +  (F aid F new ) =  F n e w
Therefore, 9*new > 9*old. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: First of all, let us consider the VC’s choose of 9 when F  — 0. In this 
case, the firm is without syndicate financing. The VC’s criterion to choose 9* becomes 9*{0) =  
min{9\E(x\9) > I2}=9*ep. By 9% > 9*SB, I get 0*(O) > P8B.
Secondly, let us consider the other extreme case: F  = I2- In this case, the lead VC’s criterion to
0=1
choose 9* is 9*(I2) =  min{0|.E[ic—s(x)|0] > 0} subject to /  {E[s(x)|0]— I2}-g{9)d9 =  0. By the
0=0* (/2)
0= 1  _  0= 1  -  
assumption J  E(x\9)-g(9)d9 < I2 , 9*(I2) is implicitly determined by /  [E{x\9)-l2]-g{9)d9 —
0=0  0=0* (i2)
0. Now I need to prove 9*(l2) < ®*SB- If I evaluate the first-order derivative of utility function at
9* =  9*(I2), I get
0=1
i r  !«•-«•</>> = J p  /  [S(*|9) -  h ]  ■ -  (S M Q  -  h )  ■ g ( n  ■ e
^  ^   . <0
=0
> 0,
which means 9*SB > 9*(I2) considering ^ \ q- q*sb =  0.
Combining the above two cases, I obtain 9*(0) > 9$B > 9*(l2), that is, &SB lies within the 
range (9*(I2), 9*(Q)).
Moreover, as 9*(F) is continuous and monotonically decreasing of F, there is a unique F* such 
that 9*(F*) = 9*s b . F* is the unique optimal amount of syndication. Q.E.D.
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IFigure 1: The timeline
(D© (D®(§) ©
T= 0 1 2
(D The VC pays the first round of financing. The project starts.
© The entrepreneur exerts his effort.
(1) The VC and the entrepreneur observe the state. If ‘Success’ state happens, they 
also receive the signal.
@ The VC makes the refinancing decision.
(D If case of refinancing, the VC pays the second round of financing. The project 
continues.
© Condition on refinancing, the project realizes the final payoff.
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+: Decision right of refinancing or not 
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Figure 3: The timing line under syndication
® <D
T= 0
(D The lead VC decides the financial structure and pays the first round of financing. 
The project starts.
(2) The entrepreneur exerts his effort.
(3 ) The lead VC and the entrepreneur observe the state. If ‘Success’ state happens, 
they also receive the signal.
@ The lead VC makes the refinancing decision.
(D If case of refinancing, the lead VC and the partner VC finance the second 
round of investment together. The project continues.
© Condition on refinancing, the project realizes the final payoff, which is distributed 
between the lead VC and partner VC.
35
Page 38 of 104







Page 39 of 104
The Capital Structure of Private Equity-backed Firms*
Xuewen Liu 
London School o f Economics
This version: April, 2007
Abstract
In this paper I study one fundamental tension between venture capitalist and management in 
private equity-backed firms and show capital structure (of private equity-back firms) is a mechanism 
to resolve the tension. The paper gives rationale for several financial arrangements in private equity 
investment. (1) Private equity deals are typically partially outside financed even though the private 
equity fund may not be financially constrained at the deal level. (2) The optimal security for outside 
financing is debt. (3) The maturity of outside security is long-term. The insight of the paper has 
applications outside of private equity.
*1 am grateful to  David Webb, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Hyun Song Shin, Francesca Cornelli, Denis Gromb, John 
Hardman Moore, Roman Inderst, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Tianxi Wang, Alexander Bleck, Sridhar Arcot, Jan Bena 
and seminar participants at LSE for helpful comments at various stages of this project. This is a much revised version 
of an earlier paper circulated under the title “Managerial incentive, ownership control and external finance” .Contact 
address: Financial markets group, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: X.liu@lse.ac.uk.
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1 Introduction
The Economist describes private equity, primarily buyout (LBO) investments, as the new king of 
capitalism.1 Up to 2006 private equity fund is responsible for more than $ trillion of investments 
globally.2 In deed, in recent years both the volume of overall trading and the size of individual 
deals have been increasing rapidly. LBO investment nowadays often acts as a key mechanism of 
corporate restructuring. Despite the unprecedented success and the increased importance of private 
equity, we have only a limited understanding of the financing and governance structure of private 
equity.3
One of the most remarkable characteristics of buyout investment is the financial structure. 
Leveraged buyouts, as the name suggests, are usually highly leveraged. The lead theory for why 
buyout deals need to involve debt leverage is Jensen (1986), who argues the debt in LBOs is to 
discipline management. But several issues around this financial arrangement remain open. In 
particular, if the debt is only to discipline management, why is this needed in addition to having 
the private equity partners monitoring managers? Furthermore, Stulz (1990) presents a formal 
model for Jensen’s idea, where short-term debt rather than long-term debt plays the disciplining 
role. But most of the time the type of debt used in LBOs is long term (Kaplan and Stein (1993)).
In this paper, I present a model for the capital structure of private equity-backed firms and 
provide a novel rational for why private equity investment needs to involve outside financing. For 
a private equity investment (a deal), there usually exists a fundamental tension between manage­
ment’s effort and the lack of commitment by the venture capitalist. The commitment problem 
arises from the time inconsistency of the venture capitalist’s exit or continuation/liquidation deci­
sion.4 Management exerts effort first, which influences the probability of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of
‘The Economist,  Nov 25th 2004.
2Financial Times, July 6th 2006.
3 One of the reasons has been the opacity of the private equity industry. Private equity, as the name suggests, is 
largely exempt from public disclosure. As for voluntary disclosure, private equity organizations tend to  be extrem ely  
reluctant to disclose information about their failures, let alone their successes. See Lerner (1998) and Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005).
4Partnership agreements typically require the fund to be finitely-lived (Sahlman (1990)), which determines that 
when and how to exit the investment is one of the most important decisions for venture capitalists. It will be clear 
later on that both the exit and the continuation/liquidation decisions can cause the sam e problem we are discussing.
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the project or the deal (at the intermediate date), and the venture capitalist makes her continua­
tion/liquidation decision afterwards when she becomes informed of the state (‘success’ or ‘failure’). 
If the project is a failure, the venture capitalist will certainly liquidate it. If the project is a suc­
cess, hbwever, the venture capitalist will not necessarily continue the project. This is because, 
conditional on ‘success’, the project’s final payoff is further exposed to external risk,5 e.g. whether 
the market condition of a successfully-developed new product or an IPO is not as good as initially 
estimated. The venture capitalist, who only cares about momentary payoffs, will not continue an 
ex-ante successful but ex-post negative forward-looking NPV project. In contrast, management 
derives private benefits from and always prefers continuation. In this case, management exerts 
higher effort if and only if he anticipates there is a higher probability of continuation upon the 
success of the project (i.e. his ex-ante effort will not be wasted or expropriated ex-post).
Obviously, management’s effort is valuable to the venture capitalist because it can increase the 
expected value of the project. In order to encourage management to exert effort ex-ante, the venture 
capitalist should commit to continue the project more often than is efficient ex-post (upon ‘success’). 
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between ex-ante high effort and ex-post efficient continuation in 
maximizing project value at the second-best. However, in a world of incomplete contracting, once 
management’s effort is sunk, the venture capitalist maximizes his own utility by continuing the firm 
only if it is worth it (i.e. only if the forward-looking NPV is positive). Anticipating this behavior 
by the venture capitalist, management may choose an effort level lower than the second best. That 
is, the lack of commitment by the venture capitalist of her exit or continuation/liquidation decision 
disincentivizes management’s ex-ante effort provision. The second best is not attainable.
Using the methodology of mechanism design, I show that capital structure is a mechanism that 
can resolve the tension and implement the second best. In other words, by changing the capital 
structure and using outside financing in private equity deals, the venture capitalist commits to 
her second-best liquidation decision. As for why outside finance can overcome the commitment
5 Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) give the definition for external risk. VCs and management may face risks that 
are equally uncertain for both parties. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) denote such uncertainties as external risks. 
Examples are the extent of future demand for an undeveloped product, the response of com petitors upon the product’s 
introduction, and the receptivity of financial markets when investors try to  sell the company or bring it public. In 
contrast, internal risk refers to uncertainty about which management is better informed than the investor. It relates 
to asymmetric information and is the main cause of the agency problem.
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issue, the mechanism is in the same spirit as the classic problem of financing and investment under 
asymmetric information. Specifically, I show that after using outside financing from a third party 
(e.g. bank) who is uninformed about the prospects of the project, the information asymmetry 
between the venture capitalist and the outside investor will lead to adverse selection.6 The bad 
project in a low state of nature may be pooled with the good project and therefore the (unprofitable) 
bad project may get continued. In short, after using outside financing, the venture capitalist 
automatically softens her continuation/liquidation decision by continuing the firm more often than 
in the case where the firm is financed solely by inside equity.
Further, I show that the degree of excessive continuation (i.e. the degree of adverse selection) is 
determined by two factors: the amount of outside financing and the type of security used. Given the 
security type (e.g. straight debt or equity), the degree of excessive continuation is monotonically 
increasing in the amount of outside financing. As the second best requires commitment of an 
optimal degree of excessive continuation, there exists a unique optimal amount of outside financing 
that can induce the commitment of the second-best, that is, there exists a unique optimal capital 
structure that maximizes the firm value. As for the security type of outside finance, I show that 
debt is optimal. This is because the debt can help the venture capitalist, who prefers to have a 
higher return on investment for a given NPV, achieve the highest return among ah security types 
she can choose.
There exists a massive literature studying the capital structure of public firms and providing 
theories to explain it. Yet these theories look unable to explain the capital structure of firms financed 
by the private capital market. For example, according to classic capital structure theory, like Myers 
and Majluf (1984), the firm should avoid using external financing whenever possible because of the 
agency costs associated with adverse selection. But in the private equity investment, it is the venture 
capitalist that collects the information upfront and monitors the process of the project afterwards. 
The outside investors (e.g. banks) are much less informed about the state of the project at the
6This is in the same spirit as Myers and M ajluf (1984). Inderst and Mtiller (2006), which studies credit analysis 
and decisions, also shows that the information asymmetry can lead to the agent’s endogenous decision bias. One of 
key differences, however, is that the borrower has information advantage in my m odel while in Inderst and Mfiller 
(2006)’s model it is the lender. Of course, the main difference lies in that two papers study different questions and 
there do not exist any moral hazard issues in that paper. This difference also distinguishes m y paper with Inderst 
and Muller (2004) which studies banks’ loan decision and does not involve any moral hazard problems.
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beginning and over the life of the investment.7 In other words, there is some information asymmetry 
between the venture capitalist and the outside investors. According to the classic theory, private 
equity fund should avoid using outside financing at the deal-level particularly because it is not 
financially constrained at the deal-level (i.e. the capital raised at the time the’ fund is formed 
may be enough to cover the required funding for some deals). Therefore, from these theories, it 
seems that we cannot answer the question why the private equity investments actually use outside 
financing at the deal-level. Counterintuitively, nevertheless, this paper shows that the information 
asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the outside investor is actually good news. Such 
information asymmetry is introduced into the firm on purpose in order to achieve efficiency. It can 
help solve the commitment problem between the venture capitalist and management. This insight 
is very close to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which also suggests that the market friction (in 
terms of asymmetric information) has merit. Interestingly and importantly, in Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995) asymmetric information (more specifically, ex-post moral hazard) is used to avoid 
ex-ante adverse selection while in my paper asymmetric information (more specifically, ex-post 
adverse selection) is to alleviate ex-ante moral hazard.
The lead article studying the financial structure of private equity investment is Axelson, Stromberg 
and Weisbach (2005). That paper also provides a rationale for why private equity firms raise ad­
ditional capital from an outsider at the deal level after the formation of the fund. However the 
motivations of outside financing in that paper and this paper are different. In Axelson, Stromberg 
and Weisbach (2005), outside financing helps alleviate an adverse selection problem, i.e. capital 
markets can take into account of public information to discipline general partners to choose more 
promising projects. In contrast, in my paper, outside financing helps solve a moral hazard problem,
i.e. allows the better provision of incentives.8
Finally, in corporate control literature there are several papers studying the lack of commitment
7 Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2005) write: “venture deals are often syndicated, with a lead venture capitalist 
raising funds from partners, who presumably take account of, at a minimum, information on the state of the economy
and industry in the same way that banks providing financing to buyouts do.”
8 Furthermore, the central questions studied in two papers are different. In Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach
(2005), the authors model how the financial structure of private equity funds can m itigate the agency problem  
between limited partners and general partners. In contrast, in my paper, I emphasize how the financial structure of 
private equity investment can solve the agency problem between management and general partners.
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as a source of inefficiency in a firm and analyzing its solution. Following Aghion and Bolton (1992), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show that switching control rights between the heterogeneous outside 
investors is a commitment mechanism. In my paper, there is no' control rights switch between 
investors. The venture capitalist is endowed with full control rights. But in Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994) there is no information asymmetry between the different investors. Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (1997) argue that ownership concentration is a way to induce commitment. In contrast, in 
my paper, I show that outside financing under information asymmetry can work as a commitment 
mechanism. Importantly, however, my paper is close to Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) in 
sense that both papers show there exists a unique optimal implementation of the second-best. In 
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) the unique optimal tradeoff between ownership control and 
management incentive demands a unique optimal ownership concentration while in my paper it 
requires a unique optimal amount of outside financing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup and the 
benchmark model where there is a tension between management’s effort and the lack of commitment 
by the venture capitalist. In section 3 ,1 show how capital structure can be a mechanism to induce 
commitment and thus resolve the tension. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the model. In 
Section 5, I make the conclusion.
2 The model
2.1 The setup
The model is cast in a simple framework of contract incompleteness and risk neutrality. There 
are three dates in the model - To, Ti and T2 . The net risk-free interest rate in the economy is 
normalized to 0 while the subjective time discount factors are assumed to be 1 (alternatively, time 
is short).
Consider a buyout project of private equity investment. The project requires an investment of 
I  at To. At To management needs to exert his effort e (where e € [0,1]) to boost the project’s 
prospects. Specifically, the effort influences the probability of the realization of two states (‘Suc­
cess’ and ‘Failure’) at T\. The probability for ‘Success’ to happen is e (equal to effort) while the
6
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probability for ‘Failure’ is 1 — e. The states are observable by management and the investor (i.e. 
venture capitalist) but not by any third party.9 In the ‘Failure’ state, the project realizes 0 final 
payoff at T2 with probability 1. In the ‘Success’ state, the final payoff at T2 is a random variable x  
with density as f(x \9), where 9 is the signal that the investor receives at T\. The density f(x\9) is 
positive in the support [0, X] and satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property(MLRP) with 
respect to 9. 9 has density g{9) in the support [0,1].
Two comments on the signal 9 are in order. Firstly, the signal distribution g{9) is exogenous, 
which means that, conditional on the ‘Success’ state, the realization of 9 at T\ is independent of 
management’s ex-ante effort. I use this setup to capture the feature that the project’s final payoff 
not only depends on management’s effort but also is exposed to some external risk characterized 
by 9. Examples of external risk are the extent of future demand for an undeveloped product, the 
response of competitors upon the product’s introduction, and the receptivity of financial markets 
when the investor try to sell the company or bring it public (Kaplan and Stromberg (2004)).10 
Secondly, I assume that the signal 9 may or may not be observable by management. In the 
following discussion, I use the weaker assumption: 9 can be observable by management.11 But I 
assume 9 is definitely not observable by a third party. Therefore, 9 is uncontractible.
9The states are uncontractible since they cannot be observed by a  third party. B ut this assumption is not crucial 
to  the result and is only for the purpose of simplicity. Alternatively I can assum e that the states are contractible.
The result of model doesn’t change.
10Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) define external risks as risks that are equally uncertain for the investor and
management. In my setup, both parties are equally uncertain about the realization o f 6. Also, in my setup, the state  
( ‘Success’ or ‘Failure’) is the internal risk. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) define internal risk as uncertainties about 
which management is better informed than the investor. It relates to asymmetric information and is the m ain cause 
of agency problem. Indeed, in my setup, management is better informed of the probability of the realization of the 
states (‘Success’ or ‘Failure’) than the investor. In fact, management can affect the realization of the states (by his 
own effort) to  some extent while the investor cannot observe m anagement’s effort and hence she is totally uncertain
about the realization of the states.
11 T he assumption that the signal 0 is observable by management is weaker than the signal 0 being unobservable
by management. In the latter case, the model becomes an incomplete contract framework, which can sim plify the 
analysis of the model. Nevertheless, even the stronger assumption - the unobservability of 6 by management - is still 
realistic and justifiable. For example, it is normal that only the venture capitalist but not management has an idea 
about the future value of a firm or a new product when bringing it to the IPO or market. This may be due to the 
more extensive business experience and/or expertise of the venture capitalist.
7
Page 46 of 104
At Ti, the investor needs to make her liquidation/continuation decision. In the case of liqui­
dation, the project realizes its liquidation value L  (0 < L < I)  at Ti in either state.12 In the case 
of continuation, the project realizes its cash flow at T2 . As I will show, in the ‘Failure’ state it is 
optimal for the investor to liquidate the project. The key decision for the investor at T\ is whether 
she should continue the project in the ‘Success’ state after she receives the signal 9. Suppose the 
investor uses a simple ‘switch’ strategy and sets the threshold to 9* (i.e. she continues the project
if and only if 9 > 9*). Then the probability of the project’s continuation at Ti conditional on the 
fl=i
‘Success’ state is p  =  f  g(9)d9. Hence the ex-ante probability of the project’s continuation is 
0=0*
e - p. To rule out trivial cases, I assume E(x\9 =  0) < L < E(x\9  =  1). W ithout loss of generality, 
0=1
I also assume f  E{x\9) ■ g(9)d9 < L.13 
0=0
Figure 1 describes the timeline.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
I assume management derives utility from his private benefit in continuation.14 Specifically,
management’s ex-ante utility function is assumed to be 17(e) =  B  x (e x p) — \I/(e), where B  is his
private benefit from continuation. The term e x  p is  the probability that he anticipates the investor
will continue the firm at Ti while the term \£(e) is management’s disutility from exerting effort,
which satisfies the standard conditions ^ 7(e) > 0 and ^"(e) > 0. Moreover, ^ (0 ) =  0, ’F(O) =  0 and
\P(1) =  + 0 0 . At this stage I abstract from management’s monetary compensation by normalizing
L2Under the alternative assumption that the liquidation values in the ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’ state  are different, our
main result does not change. Nevertheless, one justification for why the firm has the same liquidation value in two
states is that the firm holds the same firm-non-specific assets in both states although the firm-specific assets may
be different. While only firm-non-specific assets can realize the liquidation value by being sold to  other firms, the
liquidation value is the same in the two states.
13In fact, this assumption is not a necessary condition to derive the result of the paper. T he only purpose for using
this assum ption is to rule out some uninteresting cases. The weaker assumption E{x\ 6  =  0) <  L  is sufficient to  derive
the result. It will be clear later on that the uninteresting case is 9*SB =  0. Please refer to  footnote 20.
14 Naturally management (entrepreneur) has high private benefits if his new product is commercialized and/or
his firm is brought to  the IPO. Also, he cares about the loss of reputation if he is dism issed at 7 i .  The idea is
in the sam e spirit as Jensen (1986). Management is an empire builder, who always wants to  have a big project,
regardless of whether it is profitable or not. This specification also captures the nature of m anagem ent interests in
presence of separation between ownership and control. In the tradition of Hart and Moore (1990), managers’ utility
is proportional to the amount of resources directly under their control, while, at the same tim e, they enjoy a rent for
which they can’t be made pay for (as in Jensen (1986)).
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it to 0 at Ti an,d T2 . Actually I will show that no compensation scheme (state-contingent or not) 
can solve the commitment problem, hence compensation is insufficient in the sense that it cannot 
eliminate the inefficiency I am considering. At this stage, we can think of the private benefit B  as 
being high enough to make any monetary payoff negligible, hence management’s monetary payoff 
does not enter his utility function. Hereafter I normalize B  to unity (i.e. B  =  1). By the first order 
condition: U'(e) =  p— e) =  0, e is an increasing function with respect to p  (as e =  ^ /-1(p) is 
increasing). That is, the higher the probability that the investor will continue the project, the higher 
the management’s effort. Clearly, the highest effort that the investor can incentivize management 
to make is e =  ^ /-1(1) considering p < 1.
It is important to note that the continuation/liquidation decision is interpreted in a broad 
sense. For example, the continuation/liquidation decision can be alternatively interpreted as the 
exit decision by the investor. The two main exit routes in the private equity investment are an IPO 
and a private sale. In reality, most venture capital agreements provide for mergers or trade sale 
(in contrast with an IPO) as a liquidation event. In my setup, I can interpret continuation as the 
exit via an IPO while liquidation corresponds to an exit via an (early) private sale. As Fenn, Liang 
and Prowse (1997) point out, company management favors the IPO because it preserves the firm’s 
independence. It is natural to assume that management has private benefits from continuation (i.e. 
public offer).
I assume that the investor only cares about her monetary payoff. Her utility is the net monetary 
payoff of her investment.
2.2 T h e  b en ch m a rk: th e  p ro je c t is  fu l l y  in s id e  f in a n c e d
As a benchmark, in this section I assume that the project is fully inside financed. That is, the 
investor pays the full I  at To- If this is the case, the investor’s utility is equal to the NPV of the 
project. Her utility as a function of 6* can be expressed by:
9
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in the ‘Failure’ 
state at T\
( T ^ ) 2 +e[
The expected
liquidation value at
Ti for a low 0 in
the ‘Success’ state
e^ir 'J L  • g(ff)d9L 
0=0
+
The expected final 
payoff at T2 for 
a high 9 in the
‘Success’ state
/« *** ■ ■ \ 
0=1f E(x\0)'9V)dO  
0=0*
The value-added in 
the first period
The expected value-added 
in the second period
0=1
- ( /  -  L) +  e J  [ E ( x \ 6 ) - L \ - g ( e ) d B
0= 0 *
Given I  and L, the investor’s utility function depends on management’s ex-ante effort e and 
the investor’s ex-post control 6*. From the ex-ante perspective, in order to give management the 
highest incentive to exert effort, the investor’s control decision should be 6*et =  0 ,15 where 9*t 
denotes the investor’s decision to achieve highest ex-ante effort. In contrast, after management’s 
effort has been sunk (i.e. e is given), the investor’s ex-post efficient control should be 9*p = min{0| 
E(x\9) >  L}.16 That is, ex-post, the investor should continue the project if and only if the project’s 
expected payoff at T2 is higher than the opportunity cost of continuing - the liquidation value L .17
(Insert Figure 2 here)
This is the result of the optimization problem: 
M a x  e
0= 1
e e  M a x  * ' _1( /  g{9)dQ)
B* 0=8*
16This is the result of the optimization problem: 
M a x  V ( 0 m)
=  M a x  — (I  — L) +  e 6f  (E(x\d) -  L)  • g(6)d9
0 = 0 *
where e is a constant.
17Also, here I can justify that the ‘liquidation’ is the investor’s optim al strategy in ‘Failure’ state both ex-ante and 
ex-post. Ex-post, the liquidation value L  at Ti  is higher than cash flow 0 at T2 . Note that the investor loses the 
liquidation value L  in the case of continuation. Ex-ante, the investor must threaten to liquidate the project in order 
to incentivize management to exert effort.
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By assumption (E{x\9 =  0) < L), I have 9*et < 9*p. The fact that 9*et is not equal to 9*p demon­
strates that the investor cannot achieve the ex-ante highest incentive and ex-post efficient control
simultaneously. Further, as 6* moves from 9*et to 9*p in the interval [9*t , 0*p], the ex-ante incentive ef-
s=i
ficiency (the e term ) decreases while the ex-post control efficiency (the term f  (E(x\9)-L)-g(0)d9)
9=9*
increases. The highest overall efficiency should be the result of the trade-off between these two ef­
ficiencies. Figure 2 expresses the idea of the trade-off between incentive and control.18 Naturally, 
in the world where 9 is contractable, such a trade-off is feasible.
If 9* is contractable, the investor’s problem is to find an optimal 9* to be contracted to maximize 
her utility. Program 1 solves such a problem:
Program  1 (PI):
M axV(9*)
9=1
= M ax —( I —L)+  e f  [E{x\9)-L]-g{9)d9 (1)
00 9= 9 *
9=1
=  M ax e f  [E{x\9)-L\-g{9)d9 (2)
00 9 = 9 *
9= 1
s.t. f  g{9)d0 = ^ '(e ) (IC of management) (3)
9= 9*
I denote the optimal 9* in the above program as 9*SB and the utility V  at the optimum as Vs b -19
I can prove that 9*SB < 9*ep. In fact, if I evaluate the first-order derivative of the investor’s
utility function at 0*p, I obtain
9=1
dv
do* =  ^  /  [S(5|g) -  L] ■ g(0)dd -  [g(x|n -  L) ■ g(P)  ■ e
' o '  ' 2
>0
< 0,
which means that there is scope to decrease 9*ep to increase the utility, that is,
e'SB < eip and < ySB.20 (4)
18 Here control refers to  real control rather than formal control. Aghion and Tirole (1997) distinguish the formal 
and real control.
19I assume that Vs b  is positive. That is, the investor’s ex-ante net payoff is positive.
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I define the outcome vector (9*s b ,V s b ) determined by Program 1 as the Second-best. Formally,
Definition 1 (Second-best): I f  there is an equilibrium in which the outcome vector (9*, V) is 
identical to (9*SB, Vsb), then we say that this equilibrium achieves the second-best
Now let us consider the case where the 9 is uncontractable, which is the assumption of our setup. 
In fact, as management moves first (exerting his effort), the investor moves later (choosing her 
liquidation decision), and the investor cannot commit not to pursue her ex-post efficient liquidation 
decision 9^  after management’s effort has been sunk, the unique (subgame perfect nash) equilibrium 
for this sequential game is that the investor chooses the 9* as 9*p (i.e. ex-post efficiency).
From (4), we know that the investor’s utility under ex-post efficiency is lower than that under 
the second-best. Moreover, since management exerts less effort under ex-post efficiency than under 
the second-best, management’s utility decreases as well. Therefore, the second-best strictly Pareto 
dominates the fully-inside-financing equilibrium.
I summarize the above results in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The equilibrium when the project is fully inside financed is strictly sub-optimal relative 
to the second-best in terms of maximizing the investor’s utility. Moreover, from the viewpoint of 
social welfare, the second-best strictly Pareto dominates the fully-inside-financing equilibrium.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The fact that the fully-inside-financing equilibrium is strictly sub-optimal relative to the second- 
best highlights the necessity of the investor’s commitment to give up some ex-post control (i.e. 
commit to more often continuation than is efficient), which can boost ex-ante incentive. However,
0 = 1  Qe




[  [E{x\9) -  L\ ■ g(9)d9 -  [ £ ( z | 0  -  L] • g{9m) • e >  0.
6 = 0 '  < 0  
<0
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in the 0-uncontractable world, the investor lacks the mechanism to commit to such a concession, 
which in turn induces management to exert less than the second-best effort level. This, in the 
end, reduces the investor’s welfare. In the next section, I will show that the outside financing 
can actually form a mechanism that enables the investor’s commitment making the second-best 
implementable.
3 The implementation: the second-best is implementable via con­
tract design
In this section, I show that capital structure can overcome the commitment issue. Hereafter, I 
presume that there is also an outside investor who participates in financing the project from To 
and who is uninformed of the signal 6. The outside investor corresponds to banks in LBOs. I show 
that after introducing the uninformed third party to jointly finance the project, the lead investor 
will automatically continue the firm more often. The second-best is implementable.
3.1 The financial contract
Before I provide a formal proof of the implementation, I need to discuss the financial contract 
regarding the private equity-backed firm we are considering. Specifically, I define financial contract
C \  whose terms are summarized in Figure 3.
D efin ition  2 The financial contract of the firm is a vector C  := ({({(C'F1/ ,  }/= i)> where
J  is the number of claimants. R) is the cash flow for claimant j  at time t; it can be positive,
zero or negative. CRf. (C SDt) is the decision right endowed to claimant j  at time t where SD t is 
the set of all decisions made for the firm at time t.
D efinition 3 I  define {C '}, which is a contract subspace of {C} such that
J  = 2 
and
13
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C  =  ( {(CFg,CB$),(CF?,CR?UCF?,CB$)), ( (Cf$ ,CE§), (CF?,CI$UCF?,CBg)))
where E  =  lead investor, O = outside investor;
C F f  = —{I -  F), C F g  =  —F\ C R $ = nothing, C R §  = nothing;
„ I 0 if firm continues Q I 0 if firm continues
CFX =  < , CFl =  < ;
I L — F  if firm is liquidated I F  if firm is liquidated
C R f  =  Liquidation/continuation, CR® = nothing;
C F f  = x — s(x), C F °  =  s(x); C R 1 — nothing, CR% =  nothing ;
L >  F; (5)
Both s(x) and x —s(x) are non-negative and non-decreasing with respect to x. (6)
(Insert Figure 3 here)
Figure 3 describes the cash flow and control rights allocation under the contract C '. The basic 
specification of the contract Cf can be expressed as follows. There are two security holders: the 
outside investor who is uninformed of the signal 9 and the lead investor. At To, the lead investor 
contributes I —F  towards the initial investment while the outside investor contributes the remaining 
funds F. At Ti it is up to the lead investor to decider whether to liquidate or continue.21 In the 
case of continuation, both parties receive zero cash flow. In the case of liquidation, the outside 
investor is paid back his initial contribution F  from the liquidation value,22 while the lead investor 
will claim the residual liquidation value after repaying the outsider, that is L  — F. At T<i, the lead 
investor receives the state-contingent claim x  — s(x) while the outside investor gets the remaining 
payoff s(x). Actually, the only unspecified clauses in the contract C' are F  and s(x). Hence, 
hereafter I use the vector (F, s(x)) to denote the contract in space {C  }. I also assume that the
2 C onsidering the information structure in our setup where at T\ only the lead investor and management can 
observe the signal 9, it is natural to limit the contract space to the one that still gives the liquidation/continuation  
decision rights to the lead investor rather than the outside investor. It is not optim al to give the decision rights to
management, who always wants to continue.
22The reason I use this assumption is because the security type I have in mind to  model is long-term debt, in which
the security holder’s claim in the case of early liquidation is the investor’s initial investm ent (i.e. face value). In the 
extension part of the model, I will discuss the more general mechanism design where there is no exogenous lim itation  
to the amount of repayment to the outside investor in the case of early liquidation.
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outside investor is risk-neutral and he joins the financing at competitive terms.23








for the lead 
investor in the 
‘Failure’ state at T\
The expected 
residual liquidation 
value for the lead 
investor at T\ 
for a low 9 in 
the ‘Success’ state
The expected final 
payoff for the lead 
investor at T2 for 
a high 9 in the 
‘Success’ state
8= 0* 8=1
V(9*)=  - ( I - F ) +
The value-added in 
the first period
(1 -  e)(L ~  F) +e[ J  (L -  F) • g{0)d9 + J  E[x -  s(x)\9] ■ g{9)d9] 
0=0 0=8*
The expected value-added for 
the lead investor in the second period
0=1
' - ( f -  L) + e- J  {E[x -  s(x)\9] -  (L -  F )} ■ g{9)d9 (7)
8= 8 *
Ex-post, the lead investor continues the project if and only if her expected payoff at I 2 of
continuing is higher than the opportunity cost of continuing, that is,
9* =  min{0| E[x — s(x)|0] > L  — F}.
As for the outside investor who is un inform ed of 9, since his reserve utility is zero, the outside
investor’s participation condition is:
23Under the relaxed assum ption that the outside investor demands positive rent for financing, the main result of 
the model does not change.
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The expected 
liquidation
The expected The expected
liquidation value final payoff
for the outsider for the outsider
The outsider’s at Ti for a at T2 for a
outsider at T\ ‘Success’ state ‘Success’ state
in ‘Failure’ state
investment
Rewriting the above equation, we have:
e . [ f  {E[s{x)\9)-F)-g{e)de\=0.  (8)
e=e*
As for management, since he is not the agent in the contract (F, s(x)), his decision is still 
governed by his (IC) condition (3).
3.2 Im plem enting the second-best with the financial contract
The lead investor decides the financial structure (that is, chooses the financial contract (F, s(x))) 
at To when the investment takes place. Such a decision is made before management’s decision to 
exert effort. Figure (4) describes the new timeline.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
As the outside investor breaks even and receives zero surplus, the lead investor will obtain the 
same surplus and utility under the financial contract (F , s(x)) as at the second best if she chooses
9* as 6*sb
Formally,
Lem m a 1 Under the financial contract (F, s(x)), i f  0*SB is implemented in equilibrium, then Vs b  
will be automatically implemented.
The outside investor’s participation constraint is binding in our case.
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P roof: If we add the LHS of (8) to the RHS (7), we obtain
V(0*) =  —( / —£) +  e J  [E {x\e)-L ]'9 {d)de (9)
0= 0 *
which is identical with the objective function (1) in (P I). Therefore, if 9$B is implemented 
(hence e under the second best is implemented), Vs b  will be implemented. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1, we can conclude that in order to implement" the second-best we only need to 
implement 8* at 9*SB. Further, from the analysis in the last subsection, we know that 9* under the 
financial contract (P, s(x)) is determined by the following joint equations
f 9* =  min{0|P[x — s(x)|0] > L — F} (the lead investor’s rational choice) (10)
< o=i
1 f  (P[s(x)|0] — F) • g(9)d9 =  0 (IR of the outside investor) (11)
v o=o*
Essentially, 9* is determined jointly by F  and s(x). I denote the map from (P, s(x)) to 9* as 
91(F). Recall that P  is the amount of outside financing and s(x) is its security type. Now the 
implementation problem of the second best is converted to the problem whether we can find a 
combination (P , s(x)) such that 9*(F) = 0*SB’
I discuss several properties of 0*(P) first.
Lemma 2 I f  F  > 0, for any security type s(x) of outside financing, 9* is downward biased (i.e. 
d ;(F )< 9 tP).
I provide the mathematical proof first. As the lead investor is not able to offer a strictly flat 
payoff (i.e. s(x) could not be a constant) to the outside investor at T2 due to the lead investor’s 
limited liability and x € [0, X], s(x) must strictly increase in some non-zero-measure subset of [0, X], 
hence s(x) becomes an information-sensitive security.25 A higher 9 will lead to higher E[s(x)\9).
From (11), we know that the outsider claims P  on average for all 9 in [0*(P),1]. Therefore, the 
claim for the lowest signal 8*(F) must be lower than P , that is, P[s(x)|0*(P)] < P . While we have 
E[x -  s(x)|0*(P)] =  L — P  by (10), P[x|0*(P)], which equals P[s(x)|0*(P)] +  E[x — s(x)|0*(P)],
25The (log) expected value of s(x)  conditional on the signal 6 changes as 6 changes. M athematically, aiog^ ^ x^  >
0.
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must be lower than L. Combining the above result with E(x\9*p) = L, the relation 9*{F) < 9*p 
follows.
The fundamental reason for the lead investor’s ex-post decision bias is due to the information 
asymmetry between the lead investor and the outside investor. The outside financing under asym­
metric information leads to adverse selection (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In fact, after the initial 
date To’s investment I  has been sunk, the lead VC’s (forward-looking) refinancing decision at Ti is a 
one-period investment decision: whether to invest a project with the investment (opportunity) cost 
as L  and payoff as x at the next date. By Myers and Majluf (1984), if the project is fully internally 
financed (i.e. the lead investor solely occupies the entire cash flows -L  and x), the efficient separat­
ing equilibrium is achieved, i.e. the project is financed and invested if and only if it is profitable, 
that is, if and only if E[x\9] > L. Note that the project type in my setup is characterized and 
indexed by the continuous real number 9. However, if the lead investor uses external finance from 
an uninformed outsider (i.e. L  as well as x is splited between the lead investor and the outside 
investor), from Myers and Majluf (1984), adverse selection with inefficient pooling will happen. 
That is, some unprofitable bad types of project (with a low 9), which are ‘subsidized’ by the good 
types (with a high 9), will necessarily be continued. This inefficient pooling is the fundamental 
reason for the lead investor’s decision bias when outside financing is used in our model.
By Myers and Majluf (1984), the degree of adverse selection is determined by two factors: the 
amount of outside financing and the type of security used. Given the amount of the outside finance, 
the straight debt leads to the lowest degree of adverse selection. In the context of our model, the 
degree of adverse selection is the degree of excessive continuation. We have
Lem m a 3 Given F, i f  s(x) is straight debt, 9* is the least downward biased (i.e. 9*(F) is closest 
to 9lp among all 9*8 satisfying (10) and (11)).
In fact, by MLRP, we know that if s(x) is the straight debt (i.e. the payoff function of straight 
debt is s(x) =  m in(if,x) where K  is the face value), it is the least information-sensitive security. 
From the proof of Lemma 2, we also know that the ex-post decision bias of the lead investor exists 
precisely because she is no,t able to offer an information-insensitive security to the outside investor. 
In fact, the more information-sensitive the outside security s(x) is, the higher the downward bias
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of 9* is. Since straight debt is the least information-sensitive, its corresponding 6* is the least 
downward biased (i.e. closest to 9*p).
L em m a 4 To implement a given level of downward bias, when s(x) being straight debt, the smallest 
amount o f inside funding is required (i.e. I  — F  is lowest).
Actually Lemma 4 is a dual problem of Lemma 3. The former tells us that for a given amount 
of outside finance, s(x) being debt achieves the highest ex-post efficiency. The latter states that to 
achieve a certain level of efficiency s(x) being debt requires the least amount of inside financing.
Further, by Myers and Majluf (1984), given the security type of outside financing, the more 
outside finance the firm uses, there is a higher possibility of inefficient pooling (i.e. the bad type 
of firm is more likely to be financed). Similarly,
L em m a 5 Given the outside security type s(x), say being straight debt, the bias is continuous and 
increasing with respect to F  (i.e. 9*(F) is decreasing in F).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Now I am ready to present that the second-best can be implemented by the contract (F, s(x)) 
when outside security s(x) is straight debt.
T heorem  2 I f  s(x) is straight debt, there is a unique financial contract in space {(.F, s(x))} to 
implement the second-best. That is, F  is uniquely determined and it lies strictly in the interval 
(0 ,L).
Proof: see the appendix.
I denote the contract implementing the second best when s(x) is straight debt as (F, s(x))=  
(F£),min(AT,x)).
Now I need to prove that (F£),min(A’, x)) is the optimal contract in the whole contact space 
{(F, s(x))}. That is, s(x) being straight debt is most appealing to the lead investor. Therefore, 
there is a unique optimal capital structure of the firm.
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As I have shown, the lead investor’s NPV in the second best is always Vs b - However, the 
required inside funding from the lead investor to achieve this same NPV is different for different 
outside security types. Hence the return is different for different outside security types. From 
Lemma 4, I have Lemma 6 immediately.
L em m a 6 The lead investor obtains the highest return Ftp when she chooses s{x) to be straight 
debt, where R d =
In the discussion so fax, for simplicity, I ignore the participation constraint of the lead investor. 
In reality, it is quite normal in the private equity industry that the venture capitalist is constrained 
to participate because her reserve return of investment cannot be satisfied. The presence of the 
reserve return can be due to either a hurdle return demanded by the limited partners or a hurdle 
return required by the venture capitalist to exceed the opportunity cost of capital of alternative 
investments. Generally, after I take the lead investor’s participation constraint of return into 
consideration, not all security types of s(x) are feasible. For example, if the lead investor’s reserve 
return is R, then the set of the feasible financial contracts that can implement the second best 
shrinks to {(F *, s*(x))}, where F* > I  —
My general point here is that because of the special nature of private equity investment (e.g. 
with limited financial resource to invest in multiple projects) the venture capitalist in reality cares 
about the return on the investment besides the NPV of a project. To put it simple, it is natural to 
assume that the venture capitalist chooses the project with the highest return for a given NPV.
T heorem  3 I f  the lead investor prefers to have a higher return on investment for a given NPV, the 
only financial contract in space {C '} that the lead investor chooses is (F ,s(x )) =  (F d , min(AT, r)) . 
That is, the lead investor raises Fd amount o f outside finance by choosing s(x) as straight debt 
with face value K .
Importantly, if we take the payoff structure of outside security at T\ as well as at T2 into 
consideration, the outside security in my model is actually long-term debt, whose maturity is T2 . 
But if the firm is liquidated earlier at T \ , the outside investor has priority to claim the repayment 
F  from the liquidation value. This result gives the rationale for using (long-term) debt in LBO 
investment.
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4 Robustness of the model
4.1 Renegotiation is impossible
I consider renegotiation between the lead investor and management and between the lead investor 
and the outside investor in order.
4.1.1 Between the lead investor and management
As management derives a private benefit from continuing the project, there may exist some 9 
(below Q*s b ) at which continuation is socially optimal (i.e. the private benefit plus the monetary 
payoff) while liquidation is the equilibrium in the second-best. In such cases, renegotiation is 
mutually beneficial to both the investor and management ex-post. However, because management 
is penniless and obtains zero monetary compensation from the project, he does not have any 
financial resources to bribe the investor into continuation incurring. Therefore, renegotiation like 
this case is impossible.
4.1.2 Between the lead investor and the outside investor
Renegotiation between the lead investor and the outside investor is impossible due to the informa­
tion asymmetry. In fact, when 9 G [9*sB, 0*p] the lead investor inefficiently continues the unprofitable 
project in the second-best. There is scope for the lead investor and the outside investor to engage
in mutually beneficial renegotiation ex-post at Ti. However, due to asymmetric information be-
*
tween the two parties (i.e. the outside investor cannot observe 9), the only possibility for mutually 
beneficial renegotiation is that the lead investor initializes the proposal for a new contract after 
she observes 9 G [9*sB, #eP]-26 The new contract provides to liquidate the project for sure but the 
outside investor needs to reduce his claim in the liquidation value.27 However, the lead investor 
can provide the same proposal when 9 < 9*SB in which she does not decide to continue the project 
anyway even under the original contract and thus the new contract is only beneficial to the lead
2 6 In fact, this is a signaling game.
2 7 W ithout loss of generality, I assume that the lead investor has full bargain power.
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investor while making the outside investor worse off. Therefore, the outside investor will not ‘trust’ 
the lead investor. Hence, the renegotiation in this case will not happen either. The second-best 
equilibrium is sustained.
4.2 M onetary com pensation fo r  m anagem ent is insufficient
In this subsection I am going to prove that the monetary compensation scheme for management 
is insufficient. That is, the monetary compensation scheme cannot solve the commitment problem 
we discussed above. This is the reason why I could abstract from monetary compensation by 
normalizing it to zero so far.
I provide the intuition first. Suppose management cares about the monetary payoff as well as the 
private benefit. His ex-ante effort depends on his expectation on these two kinds of payoffs. Thus, 
there are also two ways for the investor to incentivize management to exert effort: pay management 
a monetary compensation and give management her commitment to continue the project. The latter 
concerns the second type of management’s preference — the private benefit. Note that both of 
the above two incentives are costly to the investor. It is obvious that monetary compensation is 
costly. The commitment is costly because some unprofitable project will be continued under the 
commitment. In order to incentivize management to.exert a certain level of effort, I argue that 
the optimal compensation policy should be a mix of monetary compensation and commitment. It 
is never optimal for the investor to use just one incentive. In particular, monetary compensation 
alone is too costly relative to a mix of monetary compensation and commitment to achieve a certain 
level of effort. That is, the commitment is always necessary for minimizing the investor’s cost and 
maximizing her wealth. In order to highlight and concentrate on the effect of commitment instead 
of monetary compensation on effort, I have disregarded the monetary compensation and assumed 
management does not care about money or that the monetary payoff is negligible compared to the 
private benefit.
Now let us move to the mathematical proof. I consider all possible monetary compensation 
schemes for management. Note that our assumption is that the ‘Failure’ and the ‘Success’ states 
are uncontractable. The only contractable variable is the ‘continuation’ and ‘liquidation’ decision. 
Therefore, the available compensation schemes for management can be expressed in,the form of (n,
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m (x)), where n (> 0) is a constant salary in case of ‘Liquidation’ and m(x) is the compensation
in case of ‘Continuation’. Under such compensation, management’s utility can be rewritten as
0=1
U{e) =  [(1 — e) +  e(l — p)]-n  +  e- f  {B  + E[m{x)\9]} ■ g{6)dQ — ^(e). By the first order condition
8=8*
0=1
U '(e)=  0 ,1 have /  {(£ -  n) +  E[m{x)\9}} ■ g{9)d9 =  tf'(e) (IC) (12)
8=8*
From (12), we obtain that e is a decreasing function of n, that is, the higher management’s 
salary in case of ‘liquidation’, the lower the effort management exerts. From the perspective of the 
investor, it is also costly for her to pay management the compensation n. Considering that the 
investor prefers management to exert high effort, n  must therefore be 0 in the optimal compensation. 
Intuitively, in order to incentivize management to exert effort, it is optimal to the investor to increase 
the difference in compensation in ‘liquidation’ and ‘continuation’. The highest difference occurs 
when n  = 0.
When the firm is fully inside financing, under the compensation scheme (n =  0, m(x)), the 
investor’s utility is
0=1
V{9*) =  — 1+  (1 — e)(L — n) +  e • {(1 — p)(L — n )+  f  E[x — m(x)\9\ ■ g(9)d9}
0=0*
0=1
=  — (J —L) +  e- /  {E [x -m (x )\d ] -L } -g (6 )d 6  (13)
0=0*
Ex-post, the investor chooses 9* as 9*p =  min{0| E[x — m(x)\9] > L}. Again, I can prove that
investor’s utility V(9*) will increase if 9* decreases a bit by using outside financing. In fact, 
0=1
e-=e;P =  ^  /  {£[» -  -  L } • g(9)dB -  {£[x -  m(x)\9'] - 1}  ■ g(9') ■ edV88*
<0  . _
>0
< 0.
Therefore, outside financing is useful and necessary in order to maximize the investor’s utility.
Nevertheless, when the investor pays monetary compensation to management, there is scope 
for the investor and management to renegotiate at T\. Without loss of generality, I assume that 
the investor has all the bargaining power. Without renegotiation, the investor chooses 9* as 9*v =  
min{0| E[x — m{x)\9\ > L). Obviously, the investor inefficiently liquidates the project too often. 
Renegotiation can achieve ex-post efficiency by pushing 9* down to min{0| E[x\9) > L}. In fact,
23
Page 62 of 104
when 9 € [min{0| E[x — m(x)\9] > L}, min{0| E[x\9) > L}), renegotiation results in the project 
being continued while the investor pays zero monetary compensation to management under such 
continuation. This renegotiation makes both parties better off relative to no renegotiation. The 
above problem is equivalent to the debt-overhang problem, where ‘debt’ is m(x).
After taking renegotiation into account, the problem is the same as the one we were studying in 
Section I, where 9* is also 9*p =  min{0| E[x\9\ > L}. Clearly, on the basis of monetary compensation 
(n, m(x)), outside financing can reduce 9* further and make 9* fall below 9*p to implement the 
second-best. Therefore, outside financing is necessary even if I take monetary compensation and 
renegotiation into account.
Finally, I want to point out that the assumption that the ‘Failure’ and the ‘Success’ states are 
uncontractable is not necessary for me to derive the result in this section — monetary compensation 
is insufficient. I can show that even if the states are contractable, monetary compensation still 
cannot solve the commitment problem. Outside financing, which can realize the commitment, is 
still necessary. As this argument is not necessary for the paper, I omit its mathematical proof.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I model the capital structure of private equity-backed firms and propose a novel 
rationale for using outside financing in private equity investment. The theoretical framework in 
this paper provides new explanations for several stylized facts. These facts include that outside 
security in buyouts is typically debt and the maturity is usually long-term. I cannot deny, however, 
the multiple motivations for the use of outside financing in reality. My theory, which provides a new 
perspective to explain the role of outside financing, can be seen as complementary to the existing 
theories.
The firms backed by the private equity fund distinguish themselves from the public firms through 
two key features: the highly-concentrated ownership and the finite fife of the investors. (Note: 
partnership agreements typically require the fund to be finitely-lived (Sahlman (1990)). The com­
bination of these two features gives rise to some special implications for the corporate governance
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of such kinds of firms. It is well recognized in the finance literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 
1997)) that concentrated ownership facilitates ownership to excise control. Simultaneously, the 
finite life of investors implies that the exit or continuation/liquidation is one of the most important 
control decisions in private equity investment. Therefore, the combined nature of concentrated 
ownership and the finite life of investors suggest that the investor (i.e. the venture capitalist) has 
both the capability and the incentive to take tight (ex-post) control of continuation/liquidation.
However, tight ex-post control may disincentivize ex-ante effort provision by management. This 
is particularly true for private equity investment, which is characterized by high external risk 
besides internal risk, and high private benefits (for management) besides his monetary utility. 
The presence of these characteristics makes the incentive problem in private equity investments 
particularly severe. Furthermore, under these features, I show that monetary performance-based 
compensation is not sufficient to mitigate the incentive problem. Using outside financing and thus 
loosing ex-post control, which can in turn provide indirect ex-ante incentive, is always necessary 
in addition to the direct incentive mechanism like monetary performance-based compensation. It 
has been well known both in academic and practice that high management incentive pay is an 
important governance mechanism in private-equity backed firm. In the paper, however, I argue 
that high leverage of capital structure -  another distinguishing aspect of private-equity backed 
firms -  is also an important incentive device in private-equity backed firms.
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A ppendix : Extension -  more general contract space
In the discussion of text, in order to simplify the analysis and highlight the main intuition of 
the model, I limit the contract space to {(.F, s(x))}, that is, if the firm is liquidated earlier at Ti, 
the outside investor has priority to claim his original investment F  from the liquidation value. In 
this subsection I consider the more general contract space. The main result of the model doesn’t 
change.
First of all, I consider the most common case that outside security is the standard long-term 
debt. Under the new assumption, the conclusion that there exists a unique implementation of the 
second-best keeps unchanged. The contract when outside security being standard long-term debt 
can be defined as (F, K ,m in(K ,x)):  the outside investor invests F  at To, obtain the face value 
K  in the case of early liquidation at Ti, and claims straight debt payoff min(.ftT,x) at T2 in the 
case of continuation. The face values at T\ and at T2 are same (both K ). Under the contract 
(F, K, min(FT, x)), the lead investor’s 9* decision is governed by
J 9* =  min{0|F[:r — min(FT, x)\9] > L  — K }  (the lead investor’s rational choice)
J 9=6* 6=1
1 — F  +  (1 — e)K  + e{ f  K  • g(9)d9 +  f  F[min(FT, x)\9] ■ g(9)d9} =  0 (IR of the outside investor)
I 0=0 ff=Q*
I have the following result.
T heo rem  4 Under the contract (F ,K ,m m (K ,x)), the lead investor’s decision bias is continuous 
and increasing with respect to F  (i.e. 9* is decreasing in F). There exists a unique amount of 
outside financing F  implementing the second-best.
Proof: see the appendix.
Secondly, I consider the more general mechanism design where there is no exogenous limitation 
to the amount of repayment to the outside investor in the case of early liquidation. Specifically,
I define contract space {(F, A, s(x))}, that is, the outside investor invests F  at To, obtains the
repayment with a fixed amount A in the case of liquidation, and claims s(x) in continuation. In 
this case, the lead investor’s 9* decision is determined by the following joint equations:
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6* — min{^|jE'[i — s(x)|#] > L — A} (the lead investor’s rational choice)
/  Q 0*  0—1
- F  +  (1 -  e)A +  e{ f  A -g(9)d9 + f  E[s(x)\9] • g(9)d9} = 0 (IR of the outside investor) 
0=0  0= 0*
Under the new contract, if the outside investor has priority to claim at least his original invest­
ment F  from the liquidation value in the case of early liquidation (i.e. A > F), I show the optimal 
contract is still the one in Theorem 3. That is, it is never optimal for the lead investor to repay 
more than the outside investor’s original investment F  at TV Otherwise the lead investor cannot 
realize the highest return. This is Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 I f  the lead investor prefers to have a higher return on investment for a given NPV, the 
only financial contract in space {(F, A, s(x))|A > F } that the lead investor chooses is (F ,A ,s (x )) 
=  (FD,F D,m in(K ,x)).
Proof: see the appendix.
However, if there is no restrication of A  > F, the optimal contract typically needs to set A  
lower than F. This helps the lead investor realize the highest return.
Theorem 6 I f  the lead investor prefers to have a higher return on investment for a given NPV, 
in the optimal financial contract of space {(F, A, s(x))}, A ’s value is between 0 and F.
Appendix: proof
Proof of Theorem 1: I only need to prove that the manager’s utility under the fully-inside-
financing is less than that under the second-best. Since 0*SB < 0*p, I have a*SB > a*ep where a*p is
0 = 1
the manager’s effort in the fully-inside-financing. Therefore, U(a*SB) = [a*SB ■ f  g(8)d9] — ^ (a BB)
0=9 sb
> K  ■ T  g{6)dS\ -  >  [B'ep ■ " T  g(B)de] -  . Q.E.D.
8=8JS e=e:p
Proof of Lemma 5: The continuity is trivial since all the functions involved are regular and 
continuous. To prove monotonicity, I need to show that if Fnew < F0n, then 0*eio >0*ld , where 
8*new and 9*old denote 9*(Fnew) and 9*(Fold) respectively.
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0=1 - 9=1
From (11), I have f  {£[(min(x, K 0id)\9]-F0id}-g(6)d9 =  0 and f  {E[(mm(x,Knew)\Q\-
0=Kld
Fnew} • g(9)d9 = 0. Hence, / " " { ^ (m in ^ ,  K old)\9] -  F M } ■ g{9)d9+ J  {£[(m in(i, K old)\9\ -
0=Kld 9=dnw
9=1
F0id} ■ g(9)d9 -  J  {£[(min(x, K new)\9] Fnew}-g(9)d9 = 0
Rewrite the above equation, I obtain,
e=9*new .  9=1
j  {E[{m m (x,K0id) \9 ] -F 0id}-g(9)d9 + f  {E[min(x, K 0id) -m in (x , )|0] -  (F0id -
0=9*new
Fnew)} ■ g{9)d9 = 0 (14)
Clearly, from Fnew < Fold, I have K 0id > Knew• Thus min(x, K 0id) — min(x, Knew) is an increas­
ing function as x e  [0,X]. Therefore, f?[min(x, K 0id)—min(x, K new)\6\ is increasing of 9. As 9^ew —►
9=1
9*old, the first term in (14) approaches 0 and the second-term approaches J  {i?[min(x, K 0id) —
9=1
min(x, Knew)\9] -  (Fm  -  Fnew)} • g(0)d9. Thus I get /  {£[min(x, K m ) -  min(x, K new)\0] -
o=8-old
(Fold — -Fne^)} • g(0)d9 =  0, which means £'[min(x, K m ) -  min(x, KnewWoid\ < F0id — Fnew
By (10), I know £[(max(0, x - K new)\Q*neW] =  L ~ Fnew But £[(max(0, x-ATneio)|0*ici]=JF[(max(O, x -  
K oid)\9*old]-E[m ax(0ix - K oid)-msix.(0,x-Knew)\9lid] =  (L-Foid)+E[mm(xt A:oW)-m in (x ,Knew)\0*oid\ < 
( L  F o ld ) + (F o ld  F n e w )  —  L  F n e w
Therefore, 9*nem > 9*old. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: First of all, let us consider the investor’s choose of 9 when F  =  0. 
In this case, the firm is fully inside financing. The investor’s criterion to choose 9* becomes 
*•(0) =  m in{0|£(i|0) > L}=9*ep. By 9\p > 9'SB, I get 9*(0) > 9*SB.
Secondly, let us consider the other extreme case: F  =  L. In this case, the investor’s criterion to
0=1
choose 9* is 9*(L) =  min{0|E[x — s(x)|0] > 0} subject to f  {E[s{x)\9\ — L } 'g{9)d9 =  0. By the
9=9" (L)
9=1  - 0=1
assumption J  E(x\9)-g(9)d9 < L, 9*(L) is implicitly determined by J  [E{x\9)~L]'g(9)d9 =  0.
0=0 0=0* (L)
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Now I need to prove 9*(L) < 0*SB- If I evaluate the first-order derivative of utility function at 
6* =  9*(L), I get
9=1
I £ |9-=9-(£) =  J  [g(»|g) -  L] ■ g ( e ) d S - (E(x |9») -  L) • g(B')  •  e
-»= *' <0  
=0
> 0 ,
which means 9*SB > 6*(L) considering 0=0*B =  0.
Combining the above two cases, I obtain 0*(O) > 0*SB > 9*(L), that is, 9BB lies within the range 
(ff*(L),0*(O)).
Moreover, as 9*(F) is continuous and decreasing of F, there is a unique F SB such that 
9*(FSB) =  9*SB. F sb  is the optimal amount of outside funding. Q.E.D.
Proof Theorem 4: The proof is similar with that of Theorem 2. In fact, in the following equation
0* =  min{0|F[x — min(iiT, x)|0] > L  — K }  (the lead investor’s rational choice)
system: 9=9* 9=1
- F  +  (1 -  e)K  +  e{ /  K  ■ g{6)d9 +  J  £[min(lir, x)\9] • g(9)d9} =  0 (IR of the outside investor) 
9=0 9=9*
fixing 9* as there are only two unknowns (K ,F ) while there are two equations. The
equation system has at most one solution (i.e. both K  and F  are unique determined by 0*s b )- 
We only need to prove there do exsit solutions for the equations system. This is obvious and it is 
similar with Theorem 2. In fact, if F  = 0 (i.e. the firm is fully inside financing), then K  =  0 and
9* =  9*p. If F  = L  (i.e. the firm uses too much outside financing), then 9* — 0. Also considering
9* is a continuous function of F , the equations system has at least one solution.
Proof of Theorem 5: I can rewrite the equations system
9* = min{0|E[x — s(x)|0] > L — A} (the lead investor’s rational choice)
9=9* 9=1
—F  +  (1 — e)A  +  e{ J  A  • g(9)d9 +  f  f?[s(x)|0] ■ g[9)d9} =  0 (IR of the outside investor)
9=0 9=9*
as
9* = min{^|E[x — s(x)|0] > L — A} (the lead investor’s rational choice)
9=1
e J  (E[s(x)\9] — A) • g(9)d9 = F  — A  (IR of the outside investor)
9=9*
Under {(F, A, s(x))|A > F}, -the right hand side of second equation is (weak) negative, which 
means that the 9* is more downward biased under {(F, A, s(x))|A > F} than under {(F, s(x))} for
29
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iI
!
a same F. Therefore, to implement a certain level of downward bias, {(F , A , s(x))|A >  F} requires 
less outside finance and thus the return is lower. The optimal contract realizing the highest return 
should be the one that specifies A = F.
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Figure 1: The timeline
©@ (D©© ©
T= 0
© The investment takes place.
© Management exerts his effort.
© The investor and management observe the state. If ‘Success’ state happens, they also receive the 
signal.
© The investor makes the continuation/liquidation decision.
© If case of liquidation, the liquidation value is realized.
© In case of continuation, the final payoff is realized.
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Control rights the investor should keep 
Control rights the investor should give up 
Control rights the investor is endowed
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Lead investor: _J ....
Liquidate ^
With outside finance under financial contract C’
TO----------------------  T1-------------------  T2
Lead investor: , Continue  ^ ^
x -s (x )
Liquidate L - F  NA
Outside investor: NA s(x)
Liquidate ^  NA
+ : Decision right of continuation/liquidation 
NA: N ot applicable
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Figure 4: The timeline with outside financing
© @  © 0 ©  ©
T= 0
© The investor decides the financial structure and the investment takes place.
© Management exerts the effort.
® The investor and management observe the state. If ‘Success’ state happens, they also receive the 
signal.
© The investor makes the continuation/liquidation decision.
© In case of liquidation, the liquidation value is distributed.
© In case of continuation, the final payoff is realized and distributed.
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ABSTRACT
We m odel the interaction  o f  financial m arket transparency and different ac­
cou n tin g  regim es. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the recently  
proposed  shift in accou nting  standards from  historic cost acco u n tin g  to mark­
ing  to market. T h e  paper shows that m arking to m arket can provide investors 
with an early warning m echanism  while historical cost gives m anagem en t a 
“veil” under which they can potentially mask a firm ’s true eco n o m ic  perfor­
m ance. T he m odel provides new  explanations for several em pirical findings  
and has som e novel im plications. We show that greater opacity in financial 
m arkets leads to m ore frequent and m ore severe crashes in asset prices (un­
der a historic-cost-accounting regim e). M oreover, our m o d el ind icates that 
historic cost accou nting  can m ake the financial m arket m ore rather than less 
volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. T h e  m echanism  shown  
in the m odel also sheds light on  the cause o f  m any financial scandals in recen t 
years.
1. Introduction
Market transparency is generally believed to be a key mechanism that re­
duces the information asymmetry among market participants thereby guar­
anteeing market efficiency. In fact, the opacity of markets was blamed for
’'‘London School of Economics. We are grateful to Hyun Song Shin and Thomas Hem m er 
for their guidance and continued support, the editor Ray Ball and one anonymous referee 
for detailed comments, and David Webb, Dimitri Vayanos, and sem inar participants at LSE 
for helpful discussions. Both authors are PhD students in finance at LSE. Communications 
to: Departm ent o f Accounting and Finance, LSE, London WC2A 2AE, UK; a.bleck@lse.ac.uk, 
x.liu@lse.ac.uk.
229
Copyright ©, University of Chicago on behalf o f the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2007
Page 77 of 104
230 A. BLECK AND X. LIU
the cause of many recent scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and Fannie 
Mae. In cases like these, investors and regulators often discover pertinent 
information too late to be able to take measures to prevent a potential cri­
sis from happening. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may be seen as a direct 
response of regulators to such criticism. Moreover, as a central piece of 
the infrastructure of financial markets aimed at enhancing market trans­
parency, accounting standards have become a key area of proposed reform 
over the last couple of years. One such proposal and central issue of the de­
bate is the shift of the accounting regime from historic cost (HC) account­
ing to marking to market (MTM) with the objective of improving market 
transparency.
However, there are many voices against such a reform. The main reason 
for the objections focuses on the infeasibility of implementing the marking- 
to-market regime. That is, the so-called “fair value” is seldom available in 
reality. Ideally, if the true value of an asset or liability could be observed, 
we would use this as the accounting measure. Marking to market would 
then lead to first-best efficiency. In reality, however, market frictions prevent 
us from determining a fair value. Most markets are too illiquid to allow 
for timely and accurate valuation. The debate does not put into question 
whether marking to market itself is optimal. The issue is rather whether it 
is possible to implement such a regime. That is, the center of the debate is 
the feasibility of marking to market, not its validity. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin 
[2004, p. 2] (hereafter, PSS) write
[ . . . ]  a rapid shift to a full mark-to-market regime may be detrimental [ . . . ] .
This is not to deny that such a transition is a desirable long-run aim. In 
the long run, large mispricings in relatively illiquid secondary markets 
would likely trigger financial innovations in order to attract new classes 
o f investors. This enlarged participation would in turn enhance liquidity, 
a situation in which our analysis shows that marking to market becomes 
more efficient
The difficulty or infeasibility of fully implementing a marking-tomarket 
scheme makes a mixed compromise unavoidable, whereby some items are 
recorded at historic cost while others are marked to market. The decision 
by the European Commission last November to endorse a mixed reporting 
scheme1 is evidence of a similar thought process. The prerequisite for find­
ing an optimal compromise, however, is to understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of different accounting regimes and their effects on market 
transparency. While understanding that the main difficulty of marking to 
market lies in its infeasibility, both academics and practitioners are not yet 
very clear about what the problems of historic cost accounting and the mech­
anisms are by which these problems are produced. The main motivation for 
this paper is to investigate these problems and their mechanisms.
In studying the accounting regimes and their economic implications, the 
first natural question to ask is what the difference between the accounting
1 “A Question o f Measurement," The Economist, October 23, 2004, p. 83.
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regimes is and why the shift from one regime to another matters. In fact, 
although the proposal to shift the accounting regime to MTM is a recent 
one, various forms of MTM accounting have already been practiced for 
centuries, particularly in the form of the so-called lower-of-cost-or-market 
(LCM) rule.
However, the implementation of the conservative principle like LCM, 
which is a “rule” rather than a “law,” depends on several factors: indus­
try, market, and country. First, LCM is seldom used in the financial indus­
try, which has been a particular target of accounting regulation in recent 
years. Even in the manufacturing industry, the LCM rule is not applica­
ble to long-term, illiquid assets. For other assets, LCM is not implemented 
with high frequency (e.g., only seasonally or annually). In the interim, it 
is still pure HC accounting that is used. Second, a liquid market is neces­
sary for the implementation of LCM, a rare situation in reality. In fact, the 
lack of liquidity is the very source of difficulty of implementing MTM in 
the first place. Third, as Ball, Robin, and Sadka [2005] show, the conser­
vative accounting practice varies across countries. In many countries, it is 
hard to strictly implement LCM. In order to highlight and study the dif­
ference between MTM and HC accounting, HC accounting in this paper 
is interpreted as HC accounting in the strict sense (i.e., without the LCM 
element).2
The main insight of this paper is that marking to market can provide 
investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives the 
manager a “veil” to potentially mask the firm’s true performance. That is, 
historical cost accounting is equivalent to granting a free call option to the 
manager. If the firm’s performance is good (i.e., its market price is high), 
the manager can choose to sell, making the book value reflect the asset’s 
market price. On the contrary, if the asset’s market value is low, he can hold 
the asset and report a book value equal to the asset’s initial cost Hence, 
however low the market value is, the manager has a “floor” in the book 
value—the project’s initial cost. At the same time, he can fully benefit from 
the project’s upside. This “convexity” in the book value is the typical feature 
of a call option. In practice, as accounting-value-based compensation, such 
as profit-based bonuses, is widely used, the manager has an incentive to 
maximize the accounting numbers. Hence he has an incentive to use his 
free option. We will essentially show that historic cost accounting will not 
only “incentivize” but also “enable” the manager to mask the firm’s true 
performance. The manager has an incentive because he would like to keep
2 In fact, even if we don’t interpret HC accounting as its pure form, HC accounting with 
LCM still differs from MTM; they have quite different economic consequences. HC accounting 
with LCM can only reveal a decrease and not an increase in the asset value (conservauve 
principle). Specifically, a company (and its investors) may well consider a project that earns 
a low positive return a failure. The investors may want it liquidated and have the resources 
redeployed. However, under HC accounting with LCM, the investors cannot distinguish a low 
positive return from a very high positive return. Hence they cannot tell that the asset is earning 
a substandard return. With MTM accounting, they would be able to. In other words, even if 
LCM is applied stringently, it provides managers a veil in some cases whereas MTM never does.
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a bad project “alive” in order to secure the convex payoff next period. He is 
also able to because he can hide the project’s poor performance by setting 
the book value equal to the asset’s initial cost.
Our main findings are two. First, our model implies a relationship between 
market transparency and asset price crashes under historic cost accounting. 
Myers and Jin [2004] document that countries where firms are more opaque 
to outside investors have a higher frequency of crashes in asset prices. Our 
model can provide an explanation for such evidence. The idea is as follows: 
In a more transparent market, the shareholder is able to distinguish good 
from bad projects and hence achieve a first-best outcome by liquidating 
poor projects. However, in more opaque financial markets, the shareholder ' 
may have to let a poor project continue as the manager can use historic cost 
accounting to pool good with bad projects. Failure of the shareholder to 
discriminate good from bad projects at an early stage allows bad projects 
to be kept alive and to potentially worsen in quality over time. The poor 
performance of these projects can thus accumulate and only eventually 
materialize at their final maturity, leading to a crash in the asset price. This 
theory also sheds light on the cause of many recent financial scandals and 
their link to the different accounting regimes. In fact, such a link has already 
been suggested by a recent report of the Bank of England (Michael [2004], 
p. 120). As an example, the author cites the crisis of U.S. Savings and Loans, 
which
[ . . . ]  stemmed in part from the fact that the (variable) interest rates on 
their deposit liabilities rose above the (fixed) rates earned on mortgage 
assets. The application o f traditional accounting meant that this showed 
up initially only gradually through negative annual net interest income.
While it eventually became clear that many S& Ls were insolvent, a fair value 
approach would have highlighted much earlier that, as a result o f changes 
in interest rates, the true economic value o f their fixed-rate mortgage assets 
was below that o f their deposit obligations. Had fair value accounting been 
used, it is likely that the S&Ls’ difficulties would have been recognised and 
addressed earlier, and perhaps at lower fiscal cost.
Second, our model will help clarify the debate about the effect of differ­
ent accounting regimes on asset price volatility. Opponents of a marking-to- 
market regime often claim that this accounting regime would lead to greater 
asset price fluctuations than would be the case under historic cost account­
ing. At first glance, this statement might seem consistent with intuition. But 
is this statement necessarily true? To the best of our knowledge, no theoret­
ical model or empirical evidence has so far been presented that shows the 
impact of accounting regimes on asset price volatility. As our model shows, 
the claim that a historic cost accounting regime makes financial markets less 
volatile is not strictly true. Historic cost accounting indeed stabilizes asset 
prices in the short term. Under the veil of this apparent stability, volatility 
actually accumulates only to hit the market at a later date. Put differently, 
historic cost accounting not only transfers volatility across time but also 
increases asset price volatility overall. This result sits in stark contrast with 
the common opinion about historic cost accounting’s effect on volatility.
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Moreover, the model can, to some extent, provide a new explanation 
for the “Black” effect (Black [1976]). Under the historic-cost-accounting 
regime, we show that a low book value is followed by high uncertainty and 
hence high volatility of the next-period return.
Despite the current hot debate and the practical importance of the is­
sue of accounting reform, there is surprisingly little theoretical and em­
pirical work done on the economic consequences of different accounting 
regimes for the financial market. The leading article on this topic is the 
PSS paper. The authors study the basic trade-off between historic cost ac­
counting and marking to market. In their model, the main problem of 
marking to market comes from the illiquidity of the secondary market. In 
such a market, the asset price is endogenous and the true and fair value 
of the asset is hence unavailable. The paper mainly concentrates on the 
position of a financial institution. It sheds light on why the opposition of 
marking to market is led by the banking and insurance industries. While 
we agree with PSS on the main problem of marking to market being its 
infeasibility, our paper mainly concentrates on the modeling of the eco­
nomic consequences of the historic-cost-accounting regime, particularly its 
effect on asset prices, its link to market crashes, and its interplay with mar­
ket transparency. Other papers that study the effects of marking to market 
on financial institutions include Strausz [2004] and Freixas and Tsomocos 
[2004].
Myers and Jin  [2004] is one of the few papers to model the relationship 
between market transparency and asset price crashes as well as stock price 
co-movement while providing evidence in support of their theory. In their 
paper, using different proxies for transparency, the authors find that coun­
tries where firms are more opaque to outside investors exhibit a higher 
frequency of crashes. In comparison with their model, our paper builds on 
quite different premises and provides a new theory that explains the existing 
empirical evidence. Moreover, besides making explicit the effect of market 
transparency on crashes, our paper models the relationship between the 
accounting regime and asset price crashes.
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith [2004] examine the factors that determine 
corporate transparency at the country level. They find that financial trans­
parency is lower in countries with a high share of state-owned enterprises. In 
addition, their findings show that corporate governance is more transpar­
ent in countries with higher levels of judicial efficiency and a common-law 
background as well as in countries where stock markets are more active and 
well developed.
Morck, \feung, and Yu [2000] and Campbell et al. [2001] study the 
relationship between the characteristics of financial markets and stock 
price variation. They show that R 2 and other measures of stock market 
synchronicity are higher in countries with relatively low per-capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) and less-developed financial markets. Bushee and 
Noe [2000] analyze the link between corporate disclosure and stock price 
volatility. Compared with this literature, our paper analyzes the effect of the 
accounting regime on asset price volatility.
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2. The Model
2.1 THE FIRM
Consider a firm that is owned by one representative shareholder. The 
shareholder employs the manager to run the firm. The firm has only one 
exogenously given project (or asset). The project lasts two periods from T o 
until T 2 when it will be liquidated by the shareholder. The whole life of the 
project spans across the dates To, 7 j, T2-  to T2. T^~ slightly precedes 7Y We 
use T2-  to model our assumption that the manager is shorter lived than the 
firm.3 The initial acquisition cost (or the market value at To) of the project 
is normalized to unity. The project yields no intermediate cash flows over its 
life. However, the manager can choose to sell any proportion of the project 
at T 1 and T2_.4 The selling price is the market value of the project at those 
dates. The market value at T 1 for the whole project is equal to 1 • (1 +  g\ ), 
where g\ denotes the project’s growth rate over the first period. Similarly, 
the market value at T2 (or T2_) is given by 1 • (1 +  gi) • (1 +  §2), where §2 is 
the growth rate in the second period. Moreover, we assume that the growth 
rates gi and g2 are positively autocorrelated. Specifically, the setup for gi 
and g2 is g\ =  £1 and g2 =  pg\ +  e2, where £\ and £2 are independent and 
both follow uniform distributions: £1 ~  Unif[—a, a] and £2 ~  Unif[—b, b] 
with a > 0, b > 0, p > 0.
Two remarks about the growth rates g\ and §2 deserve mention. First, 
they are private information. The project is firm specific. Its intrinsic worth, 
and hence its market value, is only known to the manager; it is hidden from 
the outsider or only available to him at a prohibitive cost Secondly, we use 
the assumption of positive autocorrelation mainly to illustrate the feature 
that the firm’s performance in the first period is a signal of its performance 
in the following period.5
2.2 THE AGENTS
There are two types of agents in our model: the shareholder and the 
manager. The first assumption about the manager is that he is shorter lived
3 At the same time, this timing setup highlights the fact that a longer-dated model is unsuit­
able for our purposes (we explain the last two points later on). This timing setup is thus the 
most tractable one.
4 We assume this project is divisible. Take the example o f  a supermarket chain that operates 
oudets in different locations. Should the company decide to part with some or all o f  its branches, 
the latter could be sold off as a whole, in groups, or individually. An outsider would only be 
able to see the total transaction value but be unable to put a price on the individual branches. 
He would simply lack the expertise (firm-specific project) or find it uneconomical to do so 
(high cost).
5 The assumption o f positive autocorrelation can also be justified by empirical evidence 
(e.g., GDP growth, as an aggregate performance measure o f  numerous small projects, over the 
business cycle) and on theoretical grounds (e.g., stage financing in the venture capital industry 
as an optimal contract due to sequential information revelation).
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than the project. Upon receiving his compensation at 7V., he resigns and 
leaves the firm while the project remains alive until T 2. We believe the man­
ager’s shorter life relative to that of the project is a fundamental reason 
for the inefficiency caused by historic cost accounting. Since the project is 
liquidated at the later date 7V its market value is unobservable to the out­
sider (including the shareholder) when the manager leaves the firm at 72-. 
Hence market-value-based compensation is not available to incentivize the 
manager to maximize firm value (the shareholder’s objective). Conversely, 
suppose the manager was longer lived than the project. Then the share­
holder would be able to offer a compensation scheme linking the project’s 
liquidation value to the manager’s pay. In this case, first-best efficiency can 
be achieved.6 Second, we assume that the manager is risk averse with util­
ity displaying constant absolute risk aversion defined over wealth at time T 2 
given by U( W) = 1 — e~k W, where k denotes the coefficient of risk aversion. 
The shareholder is assumed to be risk neutral for simplicity.
2.2.1. The Information Structure. The agency problem in this model arises 
from the information asymmetry between the shareholder and the manager. 
The manager as the insider knows the intrinsic value7 of the project at any 
point in time even if the project is not brought to the market to be sold. How­
ever, the shareholder as the outsider knows the intrinsic value of the project 
only when it is liquidated in the market at T 2. Prior to liquidation, the share­
holder must rely on the firm’s book value from the manager’s accounting 
report, which depends on the particular accounting regime used, to infer 
the firm’s market value. Under historic cost accounting, the firm’s book 
value contains two parts. The portion of the project the manager chooses 
to sell is transferred to cash and therefore shown at its market price. The 
remaining part of the project that the manager chooses to hold is recorded 
at its initial cost. However, under marking to market, the book value of 
the firm is the market price of the whole project. If there exists a deep 
and liquid secondary market for the project, as we assume, its market price 
is exogenous (i.e., the firm is a price-taker unlike in the setup of the PSS 
model). In this case, first-best efficiency can be achieved under the marking- 
to-market regime since the book value is just equal to the market value of 
the firm. There is no information asymmetry between the manager and the 
shareholder.
2.2.2. The Compensation Structure. The objective function of the share­
holder is to maximize the final liquidation value of the project at T 2-As for 
the manager’s compensation structure, we consider different schemes. At 
this stage, we assume that the manager’s objective is to maximize the book
6 The shorter lifetime o f the manager is also one o f the reasons for the inefficiency o f historic 
cost accounting in Plantin, Sapra, and Shin [2004].
7 The intrinsic value is the value realized if  the project is liquidated in the market.
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value at T%-. We show later on that this objective is equivalent to the man­
ager being given accounting-number-based compensation—a base salary 
plus a profit bonus (the profit at T2-  is the book value at T 2-  less the book 
value at To (the initial cost of the asset)).8 We believe the assumption of 
accounting-number-based compensation, particularly profit-based compen­
sation, to be quite reasonable.9 In fact, such compensation structures are 
widely used in practice, particularly in firms outside the United States. This 
is partly due to market inefficiency and illiquidity of some stock markets. 
Equity-based compensation may therefore cause even greater inefficiency 
not only in these countries. Even in the United States, where equity-based 
compensation is common, we still have good reason to believe that the stock 
price is significandy affected by accounting information. The assumption 
that the manager tries to maximize the accounting value does therefore not 
appear extreme.10 Besides the monetary compensation, we assume that the 
manager derives some private benefit from running the project. Hence he 
prefers to continue operating over liquidating the project, all else equal. 
This assumption is the same in spirit as in Jensen [1986], The manager 
prefers to have more and bigger projects despite their being value destroy­
ing (negative net present value).
2.2.3. The Agents’Actions. In this model, the manager’s action is to choose 
a (e [0, 1]), the proportion of the project he decides to sell at T 1 and T 2- .  
At T \, conditional on the specific a the manager chooses, the book value 
of the project is equal to BV\ =  a • (1 +  gi) +  ( 1 — a) • 1 =  1 +  a • g  1, 
where g\ is the realized growth rate of the project in the first period. The 
first term a  (1 +  g\) is the book value of the part of the project that the 
manager chooses to sell, which equals its market price. The second term 
(1 — a) is the book value of the remaining part of the project the manager 
chooses to hold, which is recorded at its initial cost. Based on the book 
value BV\, the shareholder makes the decision to either continue with or 
liquidate the whole project by trying to infer the fundamentals g i . That is, 
the shareholder’s action is actions, where actions € {liquidate, continue}. Sup­
pose the shareholder decides to continue with the project at T \ . Then the 
manager has another round of trading at T2-  just before leaving. Again, he 
can choose to sell any proportion of the remaining project at that date. The 
reason that we limit the shareholder’s action to liquidating or continuing 
is because the manager’s action is unverifiable and hence noncontractable. 
That is, the shareholder cannot force the manager to hold or sell a certain 
amount of the project. He can only passively choose to continue or liquidate 
the whole project.
8 In the extension part o f this paper, we consider share-price-based compensation.
9 However, if the shareholder decides to liquidate the whole project at T \ , we assume that 
the manager is paid based on the profit at T \ , which equals the liquidation value less the initial 
cost.
10 The PSS paper also assumes that the agent's aim is to maximize the accounting value.
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It is important to emphasize that the outsider can only observe the total 
book value 1 +  a  • g i . He cannot observe its two components separately: 
the sold part or • (1 +  gi) and the unsold part or • g\. In fact, no outsider, 
including the shareholder, can discern the project’s growth rate gi by telling 
apart the cash ar(l +  gi) from the noncash item (1 — a). We use this setup 
to capture the fundamental difference between historic cost accounting 
and marking to market, namely that the shareholder cannot perfecdy infer 
the market value from the book value.11 Otherwise, there would be no 
difference between historic cost accounting and marking to market and the 
choice of which accounting regime is employed becomes irrelevant. If this 
is the case, there is no need to debate the accounting regime reform.12
2.3 THE TIMELINE OF EVENTS
T, T, 
. 1
n  t2 
1 it m l n i l  1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Description
1 The exogenous project is given.
2,6 The manager observes the project’s market value.
3,7 The manager decides how much to sell or hold.
4,8 The book value is disclosed.
5 The shareholder decides whether to continue or liquidate the 
whole project
9 The manager receives compensation and then leaves the firm.
10 The whole project is liquidated.
FIG. 1.—Timeline.
2.4 THE DECISION RULES
Our analysis mainly concentrates on the agents’ decisions at time T\. 
Figure 2 describes the agents’ decision rules at date T i . Figure 2 also sum­
marizes all the key information of the setup outlined so far.
11 It is worth noting that even if these two items could be disentangled on the balance sheet, 
this can only occur when a  ^  0. Therefore, if  the manager’s strategy in the equilibrium is to 
choose a =  0 for a very low g i ,  then shareholders cannot infer g \  even under the assumption 
that the balance sheet reports cash separately.
12 In our context, the unobservability o f the project’s market value for the shareholder 
is due to its firm-specific nature and the heterogeneity o f its parts. Take the example o f  the 
supermarket chain. In the case o f a sale of a number o f outlets that are regionally dispersed, for 
instance, the unit sale values are not known to the outsider, only the total sale value is. Although 
the outlets are likely to be identically equipped, the location factor is likely to drive a wedge 
between their individual sale values. Knowing or determining these values is not realistically 
possible for the outsider or only at a prohibitive cost The inseparability o f  the proportion o f the 
project sold and its growth rate, and thus the unobservability o f  the project’s market value, is 
the crucial difference between historic cost accounting and marking to market. If the outsider 
could observe the growth rate and the proportion o f the project sold individually, historic cost 
accounting would be just as informative as marking to market, making them identical.
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FIG. 2.—The agents’ decision rules at time T  i . The manager observes the market value o f the 
project. Based on this information, he decides how much to sell/hold to maximize his payoff 
linked to the book value at time T%. However, when making his decision, the manager also needs 
to take the shareholder’s possible response to his action into account. If the manager’s action 
(forming a book value) results in the shareholder’s decision to liquidate the whole project, the 
manager is no longer able to go ahead with the project and hence cannot maximize his payoff 
based on the book value at time T 2 . He is then remunerated based on the liquidation value 
at time T 1 . The shareholder uses the book value, which is a function o f the fundamentals r\ 
as well as the manager’s action, as an (imperfect) signal to infer the firm’s true performance 
r 1 . Hence he makes the decision whether to continue or liquidate the whole project His aim 
is to maximize the market value o f the project at time T i.
2.5 THE FINANCIAL MARKET
In our model, different financial markets are characterized by different 
degrees of transparency. To each financial market corresponds an “unin­
formed window” as shown in figure 3. The more transparent the financial 
market is, the smaller the “uninformed window.” In our setup, where the 
project’s return is uniformly distributed over the interval [—a, a ] , we define 
the uninformed window as the subset [—a', a'] (0 < a' < a). We assume 
that the outsider can perfectly observe the true value of states in the case of 
extreme return realizations (very high or very low) that fall outside the un­
informed window. However, the shareholder cannot distinguish any given 
ex post return sampled inside the uninformed window from other returns in 
the uninformed window. The shareholder thus has to rely on the manager’s 
accounting report for more information. The idea of defining an unin­
formed window can be described as follows. In every financial market, we 
can classify two kinds of communication channels between shareholders and 
management: accounting and nonaccounting reports. The nonaccounting 
channel is more powerful in transparent markets than in opaque ones. In 
fact, in more transparent financial markets like the United States, there is a 
greater analyst and media coverage through such institutions as investment 
banks and rating agencies for instance. All these nonaccounting channels 
make the shareholder less dependent on the manager’s accounting report. 
Hence, the uninformed window, within which the shareholder has to rely
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FIG. 3.—The financial market with different degrees o f  transparency. For the same project 
whose return is uniformly distributed in the interval [—a, a], the less opaque finanical market 
has a shorter uniformed window [—o', o'], within which the shareholder has to rely on the 
accounting statement (the book value). Outside the uninformed window, the shareholder 
knows the true state.
on the manager’s accounting report, is shorter.13 We also use figure 3 to 
illustrate the setup of the financial market. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize the risk-free interest rate in the economy to zero.
3. The Equilibrium
As figure 2 shows, the agents’ actions are not independent but there 
indeed exists a strategic dimension to their decision-making process. In 
fact, the interplay of their actions constitutes a sequential game between 
the shareholder and the manager. Solving for the equilibrium of the game 
is equivalent to finding the equilibrium strategy profile of the agents ( f , h) . 
We formalize the agents’ strategies in definition 1.
DEFINITION 1 ( Strategies). The manager's strategy at time T\ is the function f ,  
which is a map from thefirst period’s return g\ to the proportion of the asset he chooses 
to sell a, that is, a = f ( g \ ) .  The shareholder’s strategy is given by the function 
h, which maps the book value at time T\ to the set {liquidate, continue}. That is, 
actions =  h(BV\), where actions e {liquidate, continue}.
It is important to note that the equilibrium does not only depend on 
the accounting scheme but also on the degree of transparency of the fi­
nancial market. The degree of transparency determines the length of the
13 Further, as the referee pointed out, we can also interpret the opaqueness measure a! as 
an LCM hurdle under the historic cost accounting regime in reality.
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uninformed window, which in turn determines the manager’s capability to 
mask the firm’s true performance. Recall that the shareholder is perfecdy 
informed, that is, his action does not depend on the disclosure of account­
ing information, when the economic fundamentals are recorded outside 
the uninformed window. Theorem 2 states the first type of equilibrium—a 
pooling equilibrium, which occurs in sufficiently opaque financial markets 
where the uninformed window is large. The proof of the theorem is provided 
later on.
THEOREM 2 {Pooling Equilibrium) . When a' > a* {b, p ,k ), the strategy profile 
s =  (f, h) at time T i constitutes a Nash equilibrium, where f  and h satisfy
m )  =
argM axii (t/(m ax(l +  ctg\, a ( l  +  g\) w heng\> 0
ore [0,1]
+  ( l - o O ( l + g l ) ( l  + & ))))
when g\ < 0
and
h(BV i) =
continue when BV\ > 1 
liquidate when BV\ < 1
In this equilibrium, the manager sells nothing (i.e., f{ g \)  =  0) if and 
only if gi falls in two extreme intervals, this is gi e [—a', a] U [a, o']. 
In the middle interval [a, a], the manager partially liquidates the project, 
where a* =  [ | ( a 2 — a?) +  \{d 5 — a3)]*, a solves {£-*d+«) (!+/>«+*) . [i +  
k (1 +  a) (ap + b)] -  ,-W + iW + p--»  . [ l +  *(l +  S) (op -  4)]) x =
0 and n satisfies -
e-k +  k(l +  g)(pa+b)  . ^-‘(i+sX'+os+l) +  «-‘] = 0 .
It is worth noting that the pooling equilibrium here is to be interpreted 
in the sense that the shareholder always continues the project, as opposed 
to the result in theorem 3 below where the firm is efficiently liquidated 
when gi < 0. The basic idea of the pooling equilibrium can be explained 
as follows. When the project’s return in the first period g\ is non-negative, 
the manager does not need to worry that the shareholder will liquidate 
the project. The manager can maximize his own expected utility without 
giving any consideration to the shareholder’s interference. However, when 
the project’s return gi is negative, the manager knows that the shareholder 
will definitely liquidate the whole project if the manager sells only a tiny 
fraction. It is thus optimal for the manager to set a =  0. This is the man­
ager’s strategy. As for the shareholder, if he observes a book value strictly 
higher (lower) than unity, he can perfectly infer the project’s return be­
ing positive (negative). Hence his dominant strategy is to continue (liqui­
date) . Observing a book value of unity, he knows the project could be either
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very good or very bad. But if the uninformed window is sufficiendy large 
(i.e., a' > a* (b, p, k)), as we assume in theorem 2, the gain of continuing 
potentially good projects dominates the loss of not liquidating bad projects. 
The shareholder’s optimal strategy is then to continue resulting in bad and 
good projects being pooled. In summary, the shareholder continues the 
whole project if the book value is not less than unity. Otherwise he liqui­
dates the project.
Before proceeding to the proof of theorem 2, we use some diagrams cre­
ated via numerical simulations of the agents’ optimal strategies to help us 
understand the intuition behind the equilibrium. First, consider the man­
ager’s strategy. In figure 4, the bottom diagram represents the manager’s 
strategy, the optimal sale a as a function of the fundamentals g \ . This is a 
nonmonotonic function. The manager sets a = 0 (i.e., holds everything) 
when gi is very low or very high, selling partially when g\ is fairly high. It 
is worth noting that the optimal a is the result of two different consider­
ations by the manager. When g\ > 0, a is the solution to the manager’s 
utility maximization problem. In this case, he needs not be concerned with 
the shareholder’s liquidating the firm, as we show later. When g\ < 0, the 
manager’s decision to sell nothing is given by his strategic consideration. 
The reason for his action is that he must otherwise fear the firm’s forced 
liquidation by the shareholder, which would thwart the manager’s chance 
of upside compensation at time T2- .  Following the manager’s action (i.e.,
C orresporxjm g t o o  va*oe
a*
9 i
FIG. 4.— The m anager’s strategy in the pooling equilibrium.
Page 89 of 104
242 A. BLECK AND X. LIU
choosing a), the shareholder can access the firm’s accounting statements 
and observe its book value as shown in the top diagram of figure 4. Note 
that the book value is a bell-shaped function of the fundamentals. The book 
value is just a simple function of the manager’s action (i.e., BV\ =  a ( l  + 
gi) +  ( l “ t t ) = l - f  ag \ ). In this diagram, we can see a pattern similar to the 
“Black” effect. That is, the lower the first-period expected return, the higher 
the volatility (uncertainty) of the next-period return. The shareholder uses 
the book value information to try to infer the fundamentals, that is, g\ = 
f ~ x (Z?Vj). For a book value (y-axis) greater than unity, there are two cor­
responding values of g\ (x-axis). As the book value decreases, the distance 
between the two g i , which measures the uncertainty of the fundamentals, 
increases. Particularly, at a book value equal to unity, the corresponding gi 
falls into two intervals. At this point, the shareholder’s uncertainty is at its 
highest.
Next, consider the shareholder’s strategy. Conditional on the book value 
he observes, the shareholder is uncertain about the economic fundamen­
tals. The top diagram in figure 5 plots his position. Particularly when 
he observes a book value of unity, the fundamental value may be any 
gi e [—a' , a] U [a, a']. This degree of uncertainty makes the shareholder’s 
optimal strategy not obvious. The bottom diagram in figure 5 depicts the 
shareholder’s payoffs of the two alternative choices (liquidate or continue) 
as functions of the fundamentals. Suppose the shareholder knows that the 










02a 2-a*-a* - a
FIG. 5.— The shareholder’s strategy in the pooling equilibrium.
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the project dominates the decision to liquidate the firm early. However, if 
gi falls in the interval [—a!, 0], liquidation is the dominant strategy. Faced 
with uncertainty, the shareholder’s strategy is to compare the potential gain 
(the area ADHIE 4- AABC) with the potential loss (the area AALM) of a 
given strategy. The result of the comparison depends on the length of the 
uninformed window. The bigger the uninformed window (a') is, the higher 
the possibility that continue becomes the dominant strategy, a* is the thresh­
old. If a' > a*, the shareholder lets the project continue, which corresponds 
to the pooling equilibrium in the sense that both bad and good projects 
are kept alive. If the shareholder observes a book value different from 
unity, continuation is the shareholder’s dominant strategy as the diagram 
shows.
The above explanation forms the basic intuition for the pooling equilib­
rium in theorem 2. Now we can proceed with the formal proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. In essence, proving that the strategy profile (/, h) 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to proving that the strategy of 
each agent is the best response to that of the other agent (i.e., /  and h are 
the best mutual responses). To aid comprehension, we organize the proof 
into a number of steps.
Step 1: If gi doesn’t fall into the uninformed window (that is, gi € 
[—a, —a'] U [a1, a]), the shareholder knows gi perfectly. Hence, there is no 
inefficiency due to market opaqueness or the accounting regime. Hence, it 
suffices to focus the discussion only on gi 6 [—a!, o'].
Step 2: Consider the shareholder’s strategy. Essentially the shareholder’s 
decision to continue or liquidate is about the trade-off between liquidating 
the project at date T\ and delaying liquidation until time T 2. Thus he needs 
to compare the time-T 1 market value of the project with its expected time-T 2 
market value. The project’s market value at T\ is MV\ =  l * ( l + g i )  =  l- |-  
g\. If the manager delays liquidation until time T 2, the project’s T 2-market 
value includes two parts. The first part is the portion of the project the man­
ager liquidated at 7 j . This is in the form of cash, which was converted before 
T2- . Its value is a  (1 +  gi). The other part is the one the manager chooses 
to hold. Its value at T2 is (1 — a) (1 +  gi) (1 +  g2)- Hence, the total market 
value at T2 is M \\ — a ( l  +  gi) +  (1 — a) (1 +  gi) (1 4* g2)> Therefore, the 
expectation of the difference in payoff between the two alternative choices 
is
E[MV2 - W ]  = £ [ ( 1 —a ) ( l + g i ) # 2] =  ( l - < * ) ( l + g i ) p g i .  (1)
From equation (1), we can see that the shareholder’s decision exclusively 
depends on the fundamentals g\. However, while the manager knows the 
fundamental value of the firm, the shareholder merely receives some infor­
mation about it through the disclosure of accounts (i.e., the book value). 
The book value thus serves as a signal of the fundamentals. It reflects the 
decision of the manager, which in turn is a function of the fundamentals. 
Specifically, the book value is given by
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BVi =  «(1 +  gi) + (1 -  ot) = 1+ a g i. (2)
Now we can discuss the shareholder’s strategy, the function actions =  
h(BVi). There are three cases for B V (1) BVi > 1, (2) BV\ < 1, and (3) 
BV\ =  1. In cases (1) and (2), the shareholder can perfectly infer the sign 
of the economic fundamentals from the book value. Given that a  is non­
negative, we have
BVi > 1 =► gi > 0, (3)
BVi < 1 = »  gi < 0. (4)
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (1) and considering the 
manager’s equilibrium strategy a  =  f ( g i )  ^  1, we obtain
BVi > 1 = *  E[MV2 -  MVi] > 0, (5)
BVi < 1 ==» E[MV2 -  MVi] < 0. (6)
From equations (5) and (6), we can get the shareholder’s optimal strategy 
(i.e., his best response to the manager’s strategy) in cases (1) and (2). That 
is, continue =  h(BV\) when BV\ > 1 and liquidate =  h(BV\) when 5 Vi < 1.
The more complicated part is case (3) when the book value equals unity. 
In this case, there are two things that can happen, either g\ =  0 or a =  0. 
In fact, whatever the fundamentals are, the book value will equal unity if 
the manager holds fully. The shareholder cannot perfectly infer the fun­
damentals. However, given the manager’s strategy, the shareholder knows 
that the manager chooses a  =  0 if and only i f g i €  [—o', a] U [ a ,  o ' ]  . Hence, 
the expected net payoff from continuing the project conditional on a book 
value of unity is
E[MV2 -  MV i | BVi =  1]
= E [ ( l + g l )pgl \B V l = l]
I /  rg\=9 rgi=«' \
=  2 a ~+~a— { j sl=J 1 + gl)Pgl ^  + / fl=i V + )
= ;T7-5---- r f f* '9 -  i ( a 3-a*) -  I(a2- a 2)] . (7)2a + a — a [3  3 2 J
From equation (7), we get the condition for the manager to continue the 
project conditional on the book value equal to unity. That is,
E[MV2 -  MVi | BVX =  1] > 0 <=► d  > a*
where
(8)
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In theorem 2, we assume a' > a*, hence the shareholder continues with the 
project, which results in the pooling equilibrium. So far, we have shown that 
actions = h(BV\) is indeed the shareholder’s best response to the manager’s 
strategy.
Step 3: Now consider the manager’s strategy. The manager’s information 
is the fundamental return g\. Suppose the realized return is non-negative, 
gi > 0, then the book value BVi =  1 -f ag\ is greater or equal to unity 
since a  is non-negative. The analysis shows that the book value will be at 
least unity whatever the non-negative a the manager chooses when gi > 0. 
Considering that the shareholder’s strategy is to continue the project if the 
book value is not less than unity, the manager needs not be concerned 
with the shareholder’s liquidation of the project. The m anager’s objective is 
equivalent to maximizing expected utility, which is a function of his bonus at 
72-. The bonus is proportional to the firm’s profit, which is the difference 
between the book value at T^~ and To (i.e., the initial cost). We begin by 
analyzing the book value at T2- ,  denoted BV2- .  As we have already shown 
in step 2, the market value of the project at 72 is MV2 =  a ( l + g i )  +  (l  — 
a) (1 4- gi) (1 -f g2)- Moreover, we know that the market value of the project 
at 72- is M V2-  =  MV2- We must have
BV2-  =  Max(B Vi, MV2- )
=  BVi +M ax(0,M T2-  - B V ^ .  (9)
The intuition behind equation (9) is as follows. At T2-  when the manager 
leaves the firm, he has another opportunity to trade. He can choose to sell 
or hold the remainder of the project that is still “alive” (i.e., the portion of 
project that was not liquidated at 7 i ) . At that date, if he chooses not to sell, 
the book value BV2-  is equal to the book value at the previous date (i.e., 
BVi ). This means the manager can report a book value at 7 2-  of at least BVi . 
This is his “floor.” The manager chooses not to sell at T 2-  when the market 
value at that date, M V2- .  is lower than 5 Vi. It is then optimal for him to 
hold everything. Alternatively, if the market value M V2-  is higher than BVi , 
he sells the remainder of the project to realize its market value. Hence, we 
can express the book value BV2_ as shown in equation (9). This equation 
also highlights the feature that the historic-cost-accounting regime gives the 
manager a free call option (i.e., a floor plus a call option). The idea behind 
the option feature of historic cost accounting is as in our analysis above: 
The manager can choose to sell (i.e., exercise the option) to make the book 
value reflect the market value when the market price is high. In addition, 
he can choose to hold (i.e., not exercise the option) to keep the book value 
unchanged when the market price is low.
Substituting M V2-  and BV\ into (9), we obtain
BV2-  =  Max(23VJ, MV2-)
=  M a x ( l + a g i , a ( l +  gi) +  (1 -  a) (1 +  gi) (1 +  g2)). (10)
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Therefore, the profit of the firm at T2-  is
PF2-  =  BV2-  -  BV0
=  M ax(l +  ag i, a ( l  +  gi) +  (1 -  a) (1 +  gi) (1 +  g2)) -  1. (11)
Since we are concerned with the situation gi > 0, from equation (11) we 
have
PF2- > 0 .  (12)
It is worth noting that the compensation structure has the characteristic of 
“limited-liability,” which means that the shareholder cannot pay a negative 
bonus in the case of a loss. Fortunately, however, we can see from equa­
tion (12) that the profit is always non-negative in our model. Hence, the
limited-liability constraint is never binding.
Suppose the manager’s bonus is a proportion P > 0 of the profit. The 
bonus is then equal to
BN = p  PF2._ =  p  • [M ax(l +  a g i , a ( l  + g i )
+  ( l - a ) ( l + * l ) ( l + & ) ) - l ] .  (13)
Substituting equation (13) into the manager’s utility function, we obtain 
his expected utility
EU = E(U(BN))
= E(U(P ’ PF*-))
= E(U(P • [M ax(l + o tg i ,a ( l  +  gi)
+  ( l - « ) ( l + * l ) ( l + & ) ) - l ] ) ) .  (14)
Recall that the manager’s utility function is U( W) = 1 — e~k'w. In order 
to save parameters, we can use an equivalent optimization scheme to replace 
the original one by replacing k with kp
Max £17 •$==>• Max E(U(P • [M ax(l + a g i ,  a (1 +  gi) 
+  ( l - « ) ( l + * l ) ( l  +  f t ) ) - l ] ) )  
<=> Max^ £(17(M ax(l +  ag i, or(l +  gi)
+  ( l - a ) ( l + g l ) ( l  + g2))))  (15)
where k is scaled up by p.
Basically, equation (15) shows that the manager’s maximizing utility based 
on his bonus is equivalent to his maximizing utility based on book value. 
Hence, we obtain the optimal strategy for the manager when g\ > 0, that
is,
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f ( g i )  = argM ax£(17(M ax(l +  ag i, a ( l  +  gT)
ae[0,l]
+  (1 - a ) ( l  +  gi ) ( l  +  #2)))) when gi < 0.
Finally, we need to show that the manager’s optimal strategy is to sell 
nothing when g\ < 0. By BV\ =  1 +  ag\, if the manager sets a to be positive, 
BVi < 1. Following the argument in step 2, the shareholder liquidates the 
firm immediately after observing BV\ < 1. If this situation happens, the 
market value of the firm is realized and the manager’s bonus is paid based 
on the firm’s liquidation value. The liquidation value however is MV\ =  
1 +  gi < 1, which means that the manager receives no bonus. This is not 
the manager’s optimal strategy. In fact, he can do better by setting a =  0, 
which makes the book value at T 1 equal unity. In this case, the shareholder 
lets the project continue according to his optimal strategy. The manager 
prefers this strategy of holding (i.e., a =  0) for two reasons. First, if he 
can make the shareholder continue with the project, the manager receives 
a valuable “call option” and his bonus is non-negative. The option comes 
from the fact that there is a positive probability of the project’s “recovery” 
at date T2- . If recovery does occur, the manager can sell the project at that 
date, thus making a profit and earning a bonus, Even if “recovery” does not 
transpire and the firm’s performance worsens, the shareholder can choose 
to hold the project at T2- ,  setting the book value to at least unity. Therefore, 
the manager has an incentive to keep the project “alive.” The second reason 
follows from the assumption that the manager derives some private benefit 
from continuing the project. This means that even though the manager 
knows perfectly that the project will not recover and may even worsen, he 
still prefers not to divest the project early since he can reap the private 
benefit in this case. He is also employed for another year and receives his 
guaranteed base salary. In sum, the manager’s strategy is to set a  =  0 when 
gi < 0, that is,
f ( g i ) = 0  when gi < 0.
Step 4: In this step, we show a and a do exist so that the manager indeed 
holds fully when g\ is high enough (i.e., g\ > a) and sells partially when gi 
is fairly high. That is, we need to show there do exist such optimal as that 
make the book value a bell-shaped function of g\.  The mechanism can be 
explained as follows. As we showed in step 2, the manager holds fully when 
gi < 0 due to his strategic concern that the shareholder would liquidate 
the project if he were to sell. However, we would ideally like to know the 
intuition for his choice to hold fully even when the return is very high. 
There are two reasons. One is the growth opportunity. The high return in 
the first period means that the expected return in the second period will be 
high. Second, as we argue in step 3, the manager has an option at date T2-.  
However, only if he holds the project can he keep this option alive. Hence, 
he has an incentive to hold the project. However, why does the manager 
prefer to sell partially rather than hold fully when the fundamentals are
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fairly good? This is due to another two factors that make the decision tend 
in the opposite direction (i.e., favor selling). One is that the manager is risk 
averse. His decision to hold or sell is equivalent to making a portfolio choice. 
Selling the asset increases his position in the risk-free asset (i.e., cash), while 
holding the project is analogous to investing in the risky asset. The standard 
trade-off induces the manager to sell partially (i.e., investing some amount 
in the risk-free asset) when g\ (the expected return of the risky asset) is not 
very high. The second force, which makes the manager sell a bit more, is the 
“floor,” which is analyzed in step 3. The more the manager sells, the higher 
the book value the manager has at 7 j. This increases the floor in the book 
value at T2- ,  which is valuable to the manager.
This concludes the proof of theorem 2. ■
Theorem 2 presents the pooling equilibrium that occurs in less trans­
parent markets. However, the more transparent the financial market is, 
the more independent the shareholder is of the manager’s accounting re­
p o r t The manager has less opportunity to mask the firm’s performance by 
pooling the bad with the good project. This change could lead to the sec­
ond kind of equilibrium—a separating equilibrium. We state this result in 
theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (SeparatingEquilibrium). Whena < a! < a*(b, p, k) , the strategy 
profile s =  (/, h) constitutes a Nash equilibrium, where f  and h are given by
f (g i )  =
Max(argMax(£(C/(max(l +  ag\, a ( l  +  gi)
ae[0,l]
+  ( l - a ) ( l + g i ) ( l + g 2)))),e)
0
when g\ > 0
when gi < 0
and
h(BVi) =
continue when BV\ > 1 
liquidate when BV\ < 1
where e is a small positive number infinitely close to zero (we can also define it by 
i  =  + 0 0 ), a* =  [f (a2 — a2) +  | ( a s — a3)]*, a solves
e-k(l+a)(l+po+b) . fl +  A(1 +  - ) ( -p +  6)]_  1 1
tf-*(i+a)(1+pi-*) . [x +  A(1 + -a){-a p _ b)] j x gw(1 +  -a) =  0
and a satisfies -ka e  kP~ + a)b(l + g) +  2M(}+a) [e * (1 + s )(1 + p s + * ) _  e  * +  
k( l  +  a) (pa+ b)e~k(l + s)(i+ps+b') +  kge-k] =  0 ‘
The emergence of the separating equilibrium is due to the uninformed 
window being shorter now. The manager can no longer pool the bad with 
the good project. It is worth noting that both the shareholder’s strategy 
and the manager’s strategy change in the separating equilibrium compared 
with their actions in the pooling equilibrium. As for the shareholder, he now
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Liquidate
Liquidate
C o n tin u e
-a? OJ
FlG. 6.— The shareholder’s strategy in the separating equilibrium.
liquidates rather than continues the project after observing a book value of 
unity. The manager changes his strategy to selling a tiny proportion of the 
project to signal to the shareholder that the project is good when it is indeed 
good.
Figure 6 describes the result of the separating equilibrium. The top dia­
gram is the shareholder’s book value information. Suppose the manager still 
adopts his optimal strategy from the pooling equilibrium (i.e., sending no 
signal to the shareholder). The book value then corresponds to the dashed 
line in the diagram. If this is the case, conditional on the book value of unity, 
the shareholder’s potential gain from continuation (the area of AABC plus 
ADEFG) is dominated by the potential loss from early liquidation (the area 
AAJK). This is due to the uninformed window being shorter now {a! < a*). 
Note that a* is the threshold (i.e., AABC -I- ADHIG = AALM). Therefore, 
the shareholder’s optimal strategy is to liquidate the project conditional on 
a book value of unity. The manager’s strategy changes as well. He signals to 
the shareholder by showing a book value infinitesimally higher than unity 
when the economic fundamentals are positive. The solid line in the top di­
agram represents the manager’s signal in terms of the book value. Now the 
shareholder can perfectly distinguish the bad from the good project and 
first-best efficiency can be achieved.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of theorem 3 is rather easy as we only need 
to compare the agents’ strategies in the separating equilibrium with those 
in the pooling equilibrium. The change of the shareholder’s strategy in the
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separating equilibrium is his action deviation when he observes a book value 
of unity. Since the uninformed window is shorter now (i.e., a! < a* (b,p,k)),  
condition (8) is no longer satisfied. The shareholder liquidates the project 
The idea behind this argument is as follows. Although the shareholder knows 
the project may be very good conditional on a book value of unity, the loss 
from a poor project dominates the gain from a promising project. Hence, it 
is optimal for the shareholder to liquidate the project. It is very important 
to note that the manager’s strategy also changes when the shareholder’s 
strategy does. Conditional on the manager’s selling nothing giving rise to a 
book value of unity, the manager knows that the shareholder will liquidate 
the project even if there is a chance of it being good. Hence the manager has 
to adapt his strategy in order to maximize his payoff: He sends an inimitable 
signal to the shareholder that the project is good when indeed the economic 
fundamentals are good by selling a tiny fraction s of the project to push the 
book value slightly above unity. Hence, f ( g i )  is the best response of the 
manager to the shareholder’s strategy. Now we can go back and check that 
the shareholder’s strategy is still the best response to the manager’s updated 
strategy. This is in fact obvious. Given the manager’s strategy, the shareholder 
knows the book value equals unity if and only if gi < 0. Now it is even more 
certain that the shareholder liquidates the project in this case. ■
4. The Implications
In this section, we analyze the model implications by a series of propo­
sitions. From theorems 2 and 3, we know that in more opaque financial 
markets the manager is better able to use historic cost accounting to pool 
bad with good projects. This hinders the shareholder from discerning the 
bad project at an early stage. The bad project can then potentially worsen in 
quality over time. The poor performance can accumulate and only eventu­
ally surface, leading to a big crash in the asset price. This is the relationship 
between market transparency and the asset price crash.
PROPOSITION 4. Under the historic-cost-accounting regime, a higher degree of 
opaqueness leads to more frequent and more severe asset price crashes.
The result of Proposition 4 is consistent with the findings in Myers and 
Jin [2 0 0 4 ] . Our contribution is that we provide a new mechanism that ex­
plains the cause of the empirical evidence. In other words, the historic-cost- 
accounting regime can provide a tool for the manager to hide the firm’s 
true performance, a scenario that can potentially lead to a crash.
Figure 7 gives a numerical example. On the horizontal axis we plot a' (i.e., 
the width of the uninformed window) and on the vertical axis As (i.e., the 
degree of the crash in the book value). The graph shows that more opaque 
financial markets exhibit a higher intensity of book value crashes, both in 
frequency and magnitude.
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o 1
Width o f th e un inform ed w in d ow  (a*)
ai
FlC. 7.— The crash in the asset price.
Proof of Proposition 4. See appendix.
Now consider what happens if the marking-to-market regime can be im­
plemented (in the sense that the fair value is observable). In this case, the 
shareholder can see through the firm’s performance. He liquidates the firm 
if £i =  — a' and no crash can happen. Yet there is a crash under historic cost 
accounting if the financial market is sufficiently opaque. This is Proposition 
5: the relationship between the accounting regime and the asset price crash.
PROPOSITION 5. In an opaque financial market (i.e., a! >  a*), more severe and 
more frequent asset price crashes result under historic cost accounting than under 
marking to market.
Proposition 5 is in the same spirit as Proposition 4. We therefore omit its 
proof.
In fact, some practitioner reports have provided evidence in support of 
the implication of Proposition 5. As a Bank of England survey states, under 
historic cost accounting the shareholder cannot distinguish the bad from 
the good project at an early stage and hence is unable to prevent a bad 
project from being kept alive and potentially worsening in quality. This is 
the reason for the crash under the historic-cost-accounting regime, while 
no such crash can happen under marking to market. The above argument 
underlines the intuition of Proposition 5.
As marking to market can lead to more efficient liquidation, the bad 
project will have a lower probability of survival over time. The asset price 
at 7*2 is less volatile under marking to market than under historic cost 
accounting.
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PROPOSITION 6. The unconditional volatility of the asset price at T% is higher 
under historic cost accounting than under marking to market.
'Moreover, the historic-cost-accounting regime not only increases the asset 
price volatility overall but it also transfers it across time in a pattern similar 
to the “Black” effect. As figure 4 shows, under historic cost accounting, the 
lower (higher) the book value at 7 j, the higher (lower) the uncertainty 
(volatility) about the liqudiation value at T^.
PROPOSITION 7. Under historic cost accounting, the asset price exhibits a pattern 
similar to the “Black ” effect in the book value.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the economic consequences of historic cost account­
ing for the financial market. Using a theoretical model we can (partially) 
answer the following two questions: What kind of inefficiency can a historic- 
cost-accounting regime cause and what is the mechanism that produces 
these inefficiencies? Our model shows that under historic cost accounting 
the opaqueness of the financial market can lead to the inefficient contin­
uation of the project by the shareholder, which in turn leads to more pro­
nounced asset price crashes, both in frequency and magnitude. However, 
under the marking-to-market regime, if the fair value is indeed available, 
these crashes do not happen. Our model also shows that historic cost ac­
counting can change the asset price volatility. In fact, it transfers asset price 
volatility across time while increasing volatility overall. The mechanism of 
historic cost accounting to produce the above effects lies in the book value’s 
convexity in the economic fundamentals. However low the market price is, 
the manager can make the book value equal to the initial cost (the floor) by 
holding the asset. At the same time, he can participate in the upside of the 
market valuation by selling. The convexity in the book value is equivalent 
to granting the manager a free-call option. When accounting-value-based 
compensation is used (which is quite common in reality), the manager has 
both the capability and the incentive to use this option. This leads to ineffi­
ciencies.
Finally, we admit that our results should be interpreted with caution since 
our results are based on a specific setup. It is impossible for us to explore all 
aspects of the features of historic cost accounting and all aspects of the ef­
fects of historic cost accounting. Notably, in the analysis of the equilibria and 
their implications, we assume that the manager’s compensation structure is 
composed of a base salary plus a profit-based bonus. We use this assumption 
because such a compensation structure is widely used in practice, particu­
larly in some industries like financial services. One of the most important 
reasons why many firms do not use market-value-based compensation un­
der historic-cost-accounting in reality is that the market may be not very liq­
uid, which makes the fair value unavailable. In this case, market-price-based
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compensation may cause more inefficiency. Also, the market price is likely 
to be very volatile and the market not efficient. Nevertheless, if the share­
holder implements a very complicated compensation structure, this may 
reduce some inefficiency of the historic-cost-accounting regime.14
However, our argument is that many theoretical compensation structures 
are hardly feasible in reality, particularly given the illiquidity and inefficiency 
of many financial markets. In order to highlight and model the effects of 
historic cost accounting on a market with such features, we have abstracted 
away from the complicated optimal compensation design by using the com­
pensation structure that is most common in reality. We believe our main 
findings are robust.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the change in the share price between T  i 
and T 2 in different financial markets. Here we suppose that the ex post 
returns in period 1 and 2 are £1 =  —d  and s 2 = —b, respectively, that is, 
the lowest returns are realized. We consider this situation for the purpose of 
exploring the asset price change in extreme cases (i.e., the worst outcom e). 
Note that when £1 falls outside the uninformed window (e.g., —a <  e < 
—a!), the shareholder can observe the return. Hence, the lowest ex post 
return that the shareholder cannot observe is £1 =  —d.
A transparent financial market: d  < a*. In such a market, the whole 
project is liquidated at T \ . Hence, there is no change in the share price 
between Tj and T 2.
As — s\ — s2 — 0. (16)
14 Our basic argument is that under historic cost accounting, share-price-based compensa­
tion is more efficient than accounting-value-based compensation if the stock market is suffi­
ciently efficient. However, under marking to market, accounting-value-based compensation is 
an improvement over share-price-based compensation if the stock market is not liquid enough. 
Basically, given two accounting schemes and two compensation schemes, there are four pairwise 
combinations between the accounting regime and the compensation scheme: (1) historic-cost- 
accounting regime and accounting-value-based compensation, (2) historic-cost-accounting 
regime and share-price-based compensation, (3) marking to market and accounting-value- 
based compensation, (4) marking to market and share-price-based compensation. We argue 
that combinations (2) and (3) are more efficient than (1) and (4). Intuitively, (1) and (4) 
make the performance measure endogenous. Since the manager can influence the perfor­
mance measure, which determines his pay, higher inefficiency ensues. Combination (1) is the 
focus o f our paper. As we show, historic cost accounting provides the manager with a free option 
to increase the book value without requiring any effort from the manager. If the manager is 
remunerated based on book value, he has an incentive to use this free option. This leads to 
inefficiency. A similar story holds for combination (4). If marking to market and a share-price- 
based measure are used to determine compensation, the share price is no longer exogenous. 
This is so because the manager can influence the share pice to some degree himself. If his 
remuneration is simultaneously based on the share price, the manager has an incentive to 
inflate the share price to increase his compensation, which also leads to inefficiency.
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Here we assume that if the project is liquidated early at Tj, the firm 
value at T 2 equals its liquidation value (e.g., all the cash generated from 
liquidation is retained within the firm until date T2). Therefore, the firm 
value does not change in the second period.
An opaque financial market: a' > a*. In such a market, the manager is able 
to pool bad with good projects by exploiting the shareholder’s ignorance 
of the project’s true quality leading the shareholder to potentially continue 
both types of projects. The book value is unity. Hence, the share price is 
the discounted expected market value of the firm at T 2 conditional on the 
book value at T 1 being unity, that is,
Sl =  E(MV2 I BVi =  1)
=  £[ (1 +  gi ) ( l  +  pgi + £ 2) I BVi =  1] 
1
2 a' + g — a 
1
2 a' + a — a
/ a p a(1 +  gi)(l  +pgi)dgi  +  /  (1 + g i ) ( l  + pgi) dg^
■d Ja
+  - ( p  +  l j a2 -f aj — -p a '3 + - ( p  +  l ja '2 — a'j
+  + 2  (/> +  +  a'j — -p a 3 +  ~(p +  1)«2 — aj
The share price at 72 is the firm’s liquidation value at that date given by 
s2 =  (1 — a') (1 — pa' — b).
Therefore, the price change is equal to
As = s\ — s2 
1
2a' +  a — a
gPO3 +  g (P +  IJa2 +  aj — ^Pa'3 +  - ( p  +  l)a /2 — a'j
-p a /3 +  - ( p  +  lja'2 +  a'j — 2 ^  ~~+
- ( l - a ' ) ( l - p a ' - 6 ) . (17)
Putting equation (16) and (17) together, we obtain As, which measures 
the extent of the asset price crash, as a function of a', which measures the 
degree of market opaqueness:
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As =  l(a')
1
2 d  + a — a
3 ^  + 2 (P +  l )^2 +  aj
-  +  \ ( P  +  1) a'2 “  a'J
+  +  2 ^  ^a2 a j
-  +  \ ( P  +  !)« 2 ~  flj
d  6 [0, a*]
a' 6 (a*, a]
With the setup of the parameters in our model, As is an increasing func­
tion of d  when the crash occurs (i.e., d  e (a*, a]), which means that the 
more opaque financial market displays more severe crashes. Moreover, As 
is a discontinuous function of d  in the whole interval [0, a]. When d  < a*, 
there is no crash at all. This discontinuity means that opaqueness not only 
leads to more severe but also more frequent asset price crashes. This idea 
becomes clearer if we consider the case of multiple projects. Suppose there 
are many projects in each financial market, the length of the uninformed 
window o f these projects in the same financial market is different but cen­
tered around d  of their own financial market. Hence, we can expect that 
the financial market with a higher d  will have more projects falling within 
the interval (a*, a], resulting in a higher frequency of crashes.
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